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Re: [TLS] Server time

Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Wed, 08 April 2015 08:11 UTC

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Date: Wed, 08 Apr 2015 10:11:50 +0200
From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Server time
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On 04/06/2015 01:44 PM, Kurt Roeckx wrote:

> There is work being done to make NTP more secure.  But if you
> don't know what time it is there is no way that we know how to
> get the correct time in a secure way.  About the best you can do
> is assume that not everybody is compromised.

What about hard-coded (CA) certificates?

The time dependency was pioneered by X.509/PKIX and its certificate
revocation model, it's not inherent to (asymmetric) cryptography.

-- 
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security

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