Re: [TLS] SCSVs and SSLv3 fallback

mrex@sap.com (Martin Rex) Mon, 08 April 2013 19:33 UTC

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To: "Yngve N. Pettersen" <yngve@spec-work.net>
Date: Mon, 08 Apr 2013 21:33:02 +0200
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From: mrex@sap.com
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Subject: Re: [TLS] SCSVs and SSLv3 fallback
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Yngve N. Pettersen wrote:
> 
> That is BTW, the principle embedded in my version rollback removal draft  
> <http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-pettersen-tls-version-rollback-removal/>,  
> which uses the server's support of the Renego extension as a proxy  
> indication to determine full version and extension tolerance, and then use  
> that information to assume that any failure to negotiate a connection,  
> when signaling the client's highest supported version with full extension  
> support in the handshake, means that the connection is being subjected to  
> a version rollback attack, and terminate the connection attempt rather  
> than roll back to an older version.

But you do realize that this idea has been killed by Microsoft shipping
its goofed RSA premaster secret version (check) in Windows7 SChannel --
and Win7 SChannel with rfc5746 support has been in such a state of misery
for almost 3 years now.

-Martin