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[TLS] Weekly github digest (TLS Working Group Drafts)

Repository Activity Summary Bot <do_not_reply@mnot.net> Sun, 19 March 2023 07:37 UTC

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Date: Sun, 19 Mar 2023 00:36:41 -0700
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Subject: [TLS] Weekly github digest (TLS Working Group Drafts)
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Issues
------
* tlswg/tls13-spec (+1/-6/💬8)
  1 issues created:
  - Key update a MUST? (by BenSmyth)
    https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/issues/1299 

  4 issues received 8 new comments:
  - #1299 Key update a MUST? (2 by BenSmyth, tomato42)
    https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/issues/1299 
  - #1291 Security considerations of using same cert for TLS client and server (4 by chris-wood, davidben, ekr, karthikbhargavan)
    https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/issues/1291 
  - #1289 Server Tracking Prevention is also needed (1 by ekr)
    https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/issues/1289 
  - #1274 Add a changelog from RFC 8446 (1 by ekr)
    https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/issues/1274 

  6 issues closed:
  - Add more text on authentication https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/issues/1284 
  - Add a changelog from RFC 8446 https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/issues/1274 
  - Too many KeyUpdates risk key collision within a connection https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/issues/1257 [PR Pending] 
  - Server Tracking Prevention is also needed https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/issues/1289 
  - Reusing psk identities enables tracking https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/issues/1287 
  - Note that clients should ignore NST if they don't support resumption https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/issues/1280 



Pull requests
-------------
* tlswg/tls13-spec (+3/-6/💬4)
  3 pull requests submitted:
  - Changelog entries (by ekr)
    https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1298 
  - Issue1284 auth text (by ekr)
    https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1297 
  - Certs plus psk (by ekr)
    https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1296 

  3 pull requests received 4 new comments:
  - #1288  Reusing psk identities enables client and server tracking (1 by ekr)
    https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1288 [propose-close] 
  - #1270 Update KeyUpdate limits with text from RFC 9147. Fixed #1257 (1 by ekr)
    https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1270 
  - #1231 RFC 8773 TLS 1.3 Extension for Certificate-Based Authentication with … (2 by ekr)
    https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1231 

  6 pull requests merged:
  - Changelog entries
    https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1298 
  - Certs plus psk
    https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1296 
  - Issue1284 auth text
    https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1297 
  - Update KeyUpdate limits with text from RFC 9147. Fixed #1257
    https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1270 
  - Discuss the implications of external PSK reuse. Fixes #1287
    https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1294 
  - Ignore NST if you don't support resumption. Fixes #1280
    https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1295 

* tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ctls (+2/-3/💬0)
  2 pull requests submitted:
  - Removed open issue regarding snake_case to camelCase conversion (by hannestschofenig)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ctls/pull/92 
  - Moved handshake_framing section (by hannestschofenig)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ctls/pull/91 

  3 pull requests merged:
  - Section "Adding a cTLS Template message type"
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ctls/pull/88 
  - Moved handshake_framing section
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ctls/pull/91 
  - Removed open issue regarding snake_case to camelCase conversion
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ctls/pull/92 


Repositories tracked by this digest:
-----------------------------------
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-semistatic-dh
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni
* https://github.com/tlswg/certificate-compression
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls-flags
* https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec
* https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts
* https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate
* https://github.com/tlswg/sniencryption
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ctls
* https://github.com/tlswg/external-psk-design-team

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