[TLS] Using ECHO mechanisms in QUIC
Martin Duke <martin.h.duke@gmail.com> Wed, 05 May 2021 15:42 UTC
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From: Martin Duke <martin.h.duke@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 05 May 2021 08:42:15 -0700
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Subject: [TLS] Using ECHO mechanisms in QUIC
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Hello TLS, I just published an individual draft in QUIC that tries to take the ECHO mechanism and use it to protect the entire Initial packet exchange in QUIC, instead of just selected fields in the client hello. It is reliant on QUIC version negotiation to recover from config mismatches: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-duke-quic-protected-initial/ Thoughts from the experts here would be welcome.
- [TLS] Using ECHO mechanisms in QUIC Martin Duke
- Re: [TLS] Using ECHO mechanisms in QUIC Christopher Wood