Re: [TLS] Certificate compression draft

[Hannes Tschofenig <[e-mail]>]

Hi Victor

why don't you use RFC 7924:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7924

This provides an even better "compression" ratio.

Ciao
Hannes


On 03/06/2017 11:58 PM, Victor Vasiliev wrote:
> Certificate compression has been discussed on this list briefly before, and
> there was some interest in at least considering a draft for it.  The
> draft now
> exists (co-authored by Alessandro and myself), and it can be found at:
> 
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ghedini-tls-certificate-compression/
>   [ GitHub repo: https://github.com/ghedo/tls-certificate-compression ]
> 
> The proposed scheme allows a client and a server to negotiate a compression
> algorithm for the server certificate message.  The scheme is purely
> opt-in on
> both sides.  The current version of the draft defines zlib and Brotli
> compression, both of which are well-specified formats with an existing
> deployment experience.
> 
> There are multiple motivations to compress certificates.  The first one
> is that
> the smaller they are, the faster they arrive (both due to the transfer
> time and
> a decreased chance of packet loss).
> 
> The second, and more interesting one, is that having small certificates is
> important for QUIC in order to achieve 1-RTT handshakes while limiting the
> opportunities for amplification attacks.  Currently, TLS 1.3 over TCP
> without
> client auth looks like this:
> 
>   Round trip 1: client sends SYN, server sends SYN ACK
>     Here, the server provides its own random value which client will
>     have to echo in the future.
>   Round trip 2: client sends ACK, ClientHello, server sends
> ServerHello...Finished
>     Here, ACK confirms to server that the client can receive packets and
> is not
>     just spoofing its source address.  Server can send the entire
> ServerHello to
>     Finished flight.
> 
> In QUIC, we are trying to merge those two rounds into one.  The problem,
> however, is that the ClientHello is one packet, and
> ServerHello...Finished can
> span multiple packets, meaning that this could be used as an amplification
> attack vector since the client's address is not yet authenticated at
> this point.
> In order to address this, the server has to limit the number of packets
> it sends
> during the first flight (i.e. ServerHello...Finished flight).  Since
> certificates make up the majority of data in that flight, making them
> smaller
> can push them under the limit and save a round-trip.
> 
> Cheers,
>   Victor.
> 
> 
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