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Re: [TLS] 0-RTT, server Application Data, and client Finished

David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org> Thu, 28 January 2016 17:36 UTC

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From: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Date: Thu, 28 Jan 2016 17:36:22 +0000
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To: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] 0-RTT, server Application Data, and client Finished
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On Wed, Jan 27, 2016 at 2:44 PM Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
wrote:

> On Wed, Jan 27, 2016 at 07:28:47PM +0000, David Benjamin wrote:
> > On Tue, Jan 26, 2016 at 10:32 PM Martin Thomson <
> martin.thomson@gmail.com>
> > wrote:
> > >
> > > I get your point, but I don't see that as a simplification.  In my
> > > mind, post-handshake client authentication doesn't happen.  Or, I
> > > don't see it being commonplace.
> >
> > But the only cases where this flow is useful (server sends non-zero
> > unauthenticated bytes at t=0.5 before the authenticated bytes at t=1.5)
> has
> > all the same pitfalls of mid-stream auth (specifically that the stream's
> > authentication switches partway through), so I don't see what avoiding
> > mid-stream auth is supposed to gain.
>
> I don't think the two situations have the same problems:
> - "Server 0-RTT" has _recipient_ identity change.
> - "Dynamic reauth" has _sender_ identity change.
>
> You have more concrete examples of things going wrong with "server
> 0-RTT"? Because I have major problems coming up with troublesome
> cases.


The client also has some 0-RTT data which, in the server 0-RTT case, the
server reports was accepted and processed. That all is associated with the
first identity rather than the second. So I believe we have sender identity
change in both cases.

David

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