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Re: [TLS] Version in record MAC

Adam Langley <agl@imperialviolet.org> Tue, 20 October 2015 00:46 UTC

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From: Adam Langley <agl@imperialviolet.org>
To: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Version in record MAC
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On Monday, October 19, 2015, Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
wrote:

> On 19 October 2015 at 11:17, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com <javascript:;>>
> wrote:
> > Yeah, I think that's riding the nonce far too hard.
>
> On what basis?  Any change in the nonce will cause the record
> decryption to fail.  That's the property we're looking for here, isn't
> it?


I don't believe that there's any reason to include the sequence number in
the AD input of an AEAD. I think that an empty AD for TLS would be fine now
that the content type is encrypted. (Not that I deeply care either way.)


Cheers

AGL


-- 
Adam Langley agl@imperialviolet.org https://www.imperialviolet.org

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