[TLS] [Errata Verified] RFC6176 (5536)
RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org> Mon, 18 March 2024 08:11 UTC
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Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2024 01:11:10 -0700
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Subject: [TLS] [Errata Verified] RFC6176 (5536)
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The following errata report has been verified for RFC6176, "Prohibiting Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) Version 2.0". -------------------------------------- You may review the report below and at: https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5536 -------------------------------------- Status: Verified Type: Technical Reported by: Eugene Adell <eugene.adell@gmail.com> Date Reported: 2018-10-19 Verified by: Paul Wouters (IESG) Section: 1 Original Text ------------- RFC 4346 [TLS1.1], and later RFC 5246 [TLS1.2], explicitly warned implementers that the "ability to send version 2.0 CLIENT-HELLO messages will be phased out with all due haste". This document accomplishes this by updating the backward compatibility sections found in TLS [TLS1.0][TLS1.1][TLS1.2]. Corrected Text -------------- RFC 2246 [TLS1.0], and later RFC 4346 [TLS1.1], then RFC 5246 [TLS1.2] explicitly warned implementers that the "ability to send version 2.0 CLIENT-HELLO messages will be phased out with all due haste". This document accomplishes this by updating the backward compatibility sections found in TLS [TLS1.0][TLS1.1][TLS1.2]. Notes ----- The warning on the version 2.0 Client Hello is as old as the first TLS version (RFC 2246 Appendix E). That's what the authors meant and wanted to highlight by listing two of the three RFCs containing this warning. This is confirmed by their last sentence. It looks like a small mistake without concrete effects, I push this errata considering "IESG Processing of RFC Errata for the IETF Stream rule 6" -------------------------------------- RFC6176 (draft-ietf-tls-ssl2-must-not-04) -------------------------------------- Title : Prohibiting Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) Version 2.0 Publication Date : March 2011 Author(s) : S. Turner, T. Polk Category : PROPOSED STANDARD Source : Transport Layer Security Stream : IETF Verifying Party : IESG
- [TLS] [Errata Verified] RFC6176 (5536) RFC Errata System