[TLS] Light-weight TLS & Elliptic security for assessments & update of PQC & TLS with my own work also but also further reading i have done : RS
Duke Abbaddon <duke.abbaddon@gmail.com> Thu, 26 January 2023 20:41 UTC
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Subject: [TLS] Light-weight TLS & Elliptic security for assessments & update of PQC & TLS with my own work also but also further reading i have done : RS
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Light-weight TLS & Elliptic security for assessments & update of PQC & TLS with my own work also but also further reading i have done : RS Lightweight Cryptography https://www.cryptrec.go.jp/report/cryptrec-gl-2003-2016en.pdf https://www.scitepress.org/papers/2014/49006/49006.pdf Performance Evaluation Comparison LIGHTWEIGHT CIPHERS NIST LightWeight Cryptography Requirements https://scholarworks.calstate.edu/downloads/k0698968b TLS 1.3 on Lightweight Crypto https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/095.pdf Computation of Hilbert class polynomials and modular polynomials from super-singular elliptic curves https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/064.pdf The Security of ChaCha20-Poly1305 in the Multi-user Setting https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/085.pdf Post Quantum: Verification of Correctness and Security Properties for CRYSTALS-KYBER https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/087.pdf Verification of the (1–δ)-Correctness Proof of CRYSTALS-KYBER with Number Theoretic Transform https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/027.pdf A Practical Template Attack on CRYSTALS-Dilithium https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/050.pdf ************** ICE-SSRTP GEA Replacement 2022 + (c)RS "GEA-1 and GEA-2, which are very similar (GEA-2 is just an extension of GEA-1 with a higher amount of processing, and apparently not weakened) are bit-oriented stream ciphers." GEA-2 > GEA-3 is therefor 64Bit Safe (Mobile calls) & 128Bit Safe (Reasonable security) SHA2, SHA3therefor 128Bit Safe (Reasonable security Mobile) ++ AES & PolyChaCha both provide a premise of 128Bit++ So by reason alone GEA has a place in our hearts. * ICE-SSRTP GEA Replacement 2022 + (c)RS https://is.gd/CryptographicProves ICE-SSRTP constitutes 2 parts: The nonce: Time Value Inverted Nonce Packet: Obfuscation The Main Cypher: AES, CHACHA20-POLY1305, GEA, 3DES & Other RTP Classifications * In the case of Audio & Video; The Nonce is transmitted per frame group & displaces the content in the correct manner In the case of Data; Per group of packets * ICE-SSRTP : Network Protocol Main Cypher Package is a recommended Cypher; for example AES, Aria, Clefia & hardware Decrypted & Encrypted where possible, The containment is a Tunnel; Such as maintained by a video streaming service & GSM voice call (on reception of call & Arrangement of reception), The tunnel is a security certificates main job & is from source to end & routed, Normally 128Bit to 512Bit RSA,EEC: AES, GEA, ARIA, CLEFIA Nonces are used for Identification & Verification, Special perposes & Small packet carrying (with me) Nonces can arrange data & offer order garentees under routing protocols. Cases of nonce Encryption: Ideally due to internet traffic protocols (examples): NTP 73bits, DNS 53Bits, Rout Mapping 50bits to 370bits estimated. due to these main protocols being small they almost exclusively advise use as nonce encryption; most probably 64bit enclosed in a tunnel, To & From the DNS & NTP if used regularly & due to NTP being specialised low traffic workload in most cases & DNS being regular traffic... Containment on encrypted tunnel is recommended in the case of main traffic & therefore, Can use 64Bit EEC NONCE & because larger encryption blocks are not recommended & they clog the internet with larger bandwidth requirements, We can use 64Bit Ciphers with packets like DNS & With NTP (A Single QUICC protocol delivery with a EEC/RSA Delivery) * Nonce ICE-SSRTP: Time Value Inverted ICE-SSRTP (c)Rupert S The Nonce Variable Needed content list Time inverted : Value T: Consisting of T(time) Tick(How many seconds), Variable Inversion of content though FFT & Variable reversal of nonce & main Enciphered package Encryption methods: Bit length Nonce : 16Bit & 32Bit (SiMD decrypt) Bit length Main Encryption Packet : 32Bit, 48Bit, 64Bit (SiMD decrypt) Bit length Main Encryption Packet H : 64Bit, 96Bit, 128Bit (TPM/Security unit/SiMD decrypt) Methods of obfuscation: Packet swap (order) Inversion (Data & band, Data Band order(High/Low) Time Variable addition to Nonce &or Data Compression of packet with nonce decompression list: BZip, GZip, LHZ Main Core Accelerated Encryption Blocks: GEA (all version) & bit depth CHACHA20-POLY1305 AES GCM : CCM : CBC Value T : Nonce { Packet A : Packet B : Packet C } T = Inversion of 1 = { Nonce : Packet Order : Content } Value of Nonce = { Noise Removal (wavelet) : Bit Addition : Byte Order } ***** Nonce reasoning : Dual Cypher : RS Larger packets (Hardware Decrypt), Smaller Encrypted nonce (CPU Processed) By the nonce we can therefor obfuscate the content of the Cryptic packet For examples: Nonce = Elliptic Noise Packets are noisy Nonce = Swap Packets are swapped in order Nonce = Bit addition / Byte swap We do maths on the solved packets Nonce = Banding arrangements We swap bands in the Audio & Video Data Nonce = Inversion We invert the packets before or after processing * Main Cipher Package : ICE-SSRTP The Main Cypher: AES, CHACHA20-POLY1305, GEA, 3DES & Other RTP Classifications Encryption methods: Bit length Nonce : 16Bit & 32Bit (SiMD decrypt) Bit length Main Encryption Packet : 32Bit, 48Bit, 64Bit (SiMD decrypt) Bit length Main Encryption Packet H : 64Bit, 96Bit, 128Bit (TPM/Security unit/SiMD decrypt) Refer to Nonce ICE-SSRTP for packet dual Decryption/Encryption Main Cipher Package is a recommended Cipher; for example AES, Aria, Clefia & hardware Decrypted & Encrypted where possible, The containment is a Tunnel; Such as maintained by a video streaming service & GSM voice call (on reception of call & Arrangement of reception), The tunnel is a security certificates main job & is from source to end & routed, Normally 128Bit to 512Bit RSA,EEC: AES, GEA, ARIA, CLEFIA Nonce are used for Identification & Verification, Special purposes & Small packet carrying (with me) Nonce can arrange data & offer order guarantees under routing protocols. * ICE-SSRTP Block Compressed Encipher ICE-SSRTP Encryption uses 2 Attributes & on the whole compression does not affect security of the Encipher. Nonce 16Bit/32Bit AES/GEA Compression header (Encrypted) Main Block (Block compressed with header & then lightly Encipher) (*3 or 4) The header keeps the Data compressed a secret & is useful for EXE & DLL because headers auto load exe's in the right order. Refer to Code-Speed & ICE-SSRTP * Correct Time : EEC Elliptic & Nonce timer function: "The thing about random unique nonce with :dev/rng is that verifying the nonce's uniqueness is an issue, with SSRTP nonce, Time intrinsics allow only one play time https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8954/ So what about if they have a reset phone & have not got the correct time ? mine wouldn't do NTP until i set it to pools.ntp.org, the telephone network would not change the time!" So the nonce may need a seconds from arrival timer; So that it is from the time it arrives (in your terms) & additionally a sent and arrival time so that when you get the correct time; It still works! In essence TLS & OSCP need a time from arrival (to verify link/Security CRT), It does not matter if that NTP timer is off by 5 Minutes... You can use the Time related EEC Elliptic curve & as long as it is timed from arrival & sends back a sample with a from time & until... That EEC Elliptic & Nonce will work. RS * TLS key sharing agreement : RS I have regarded the tls key sharing agreement & it occurs to me that all modes may be improved with combination of a Nonce-PSK-Type-Key, For example held by the verifying certificate agency such as lets encrypt & SafeSSL & Cloudflare, Submitting a lightly cyphered PSK Key would take milliseconds & consume only 10000th of a second on GB/S Ethernet & therefor be unnoticeable and thus secure for the initiation encounter, So the proposal is TLS combine an additional initiation: Changing Nonce:PSK (from secure source) + verification TLS Main initiation : ECDHE FFDHE DHE P256>P384 etcetera (under PSK) Key exchange > Final EEC Key with variable updates, So PSK can find a use that does not involve directly divulging the PSK to over use & secures the PSK by hour & variance. PSK https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9258/ https://datatracker.ietf.org/group/tls/about/ (c)Rupert S * https://science.n-helix.com/2022/03/ice-ssrtp.html Code Speed https://science.n-helix.com/2022/08/simd.html https://science.n-helix.com/2022/09/ovccans.html Chaos https://science.n-helix.com/2022/02/interrupt-entropy.html https://science.n-helix.com/2022/02/rdseed.html https://science.n-helix.com/2020/06/cryptoseed.html sRTP Chaos Nonce: Certificate transactions; TLS & OCSP Security Protocols https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8954/ RSA-PSS RSASSA-PSS is a probabilistic signature scheme (PSS) with appendix RSAES-OAEP (Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding) https://www.cryptosys.net/pki/manpki/pki_rsaschemes.html https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8017 https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5756 PSK: Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suites for TLS with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5487/ https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8442/ https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9258/ Nonce & Plaintext, Token & SequenceID (Bearing in mind that ICE-SSRTP Nonce is compatible) https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-howard-gssapi-aead-01.txt AES-GCM-SIV: Nonce Misuse-Resistant Authenticated Encryption https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8452/ Adding the nonce to GMAC makes GMAC's unique : ICE-ssRTP https://www.zerotier.com/2019/09/04/aes-gmac-ctr-siv/ https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5297#page-15 AES-GCM SRTP https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc7714/ AES-CCM https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6655/ Lightweight Cryptography https://www.cryptrec.go.jp/report/cryptrec-gl-2003-2016en.pdf https://www.scitepress.org/papers/2014/49006/49006.pdf Performance Evaluation Comparison LIGHTWEIGHT CIPHERS NIST LightWeight Cryptography Requirements https://scholarworks.calstate.edu/downloads/k0698968b TLS 1.3 on Lightweight Crypto https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/095.pdf Computation of Hilbert class polynomials and modular polynomials from super-singular elliptic curves https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/064.pdf The Security of ChaCha20-Poly1305 in the Multi-user Setting https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/085.pdf AES-NI Compatible Ciphers : AES, ARIA, CLEFIA https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-cipher-catalog-01#page-3 CLEFIA : Large size table, Pure function https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6114 ARIA : Random is a big+ to anonymity bit 128Bit's of data https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5794 ARIA is conformant https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6209 ARIA SRTP https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8269#page-14 Post Quantum: Verification of Correctness and Security Properties for CRYSTALS-KYBER https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/087.pdf Verification of the (1–δ)-Correctness Proof of CRYSTALS-KYBER with Number Theoretic Transform https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/027.pdf A Practical Template Attack on CRYSTALS-Dilithium https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/050.pdf Compact TLS 1.3 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-ctls/ DTLS 2023 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tsvwg-dtls-over-sctp-bis/ TLS 1.2 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5246/ https://datatracker.ietf.org/group/tls/about/ https://blog.cloudflare.com/post-quantum-for-all/ Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms Specification https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5905/ https://science.n-helix.com/2022/01/ntp.html https://is.gd/SecurityHSM https://is.gd/WebPKI Crypto Libraries https://github.com/miracl/core https://github.com/jedisct1/libsodium * AES-SIV & ARIA & CLEFIA the merits of 2023-01 RS As documentation shows ARIA uses a Random noise input in the encryption, I believe this is so that it is hard to pick up the signals... On the other hand it has a max data size of 192bit (AES does not), I feel that ARIA has merits in WiFi & Telecoms. CLEFIA has a large data pathway; So could be good for large transfers & Drive Storage. As i say : ARIA, The Random element is about Stealth AES-SIV has merits like AES-GCM, fast and relatively Safe. RS * ICE-SSRTP is relatively simple & involves a Dual Cypher of many classifications AES, CHACHA20-POLY1305, GEA, 3DES & Other RTP Classifications such as UDP & TCP & GRE ICE-SSRTP is useful for: TV & Satellite encoding & decryption Messaging applications; Video & Call Encoding Improved AES, CHACHA20-POLY1305, GEA, 3DES & Other RTP Classifications such as UDP & TCP & GRE 3G, 4G LTE & 5G Encoding Radio & Telecoms * In terms of lightweight security (Bluetooth ear-buds & other tiny things) : 64Bit AES/3DES/GEA with ICE-SSRTP Nonce makes perfect sense. In Terms of heavier (in terms of ARM Core Phones & Network-boxes) : Both the 64Bit Instruction-set & the 32Bit SiMD/NANO + AES-NE + Advance Crypto Instruction ACI, 96Bit/128Bit AES/3DES/GEA * 3 Packets per nonce ICE-SSRTP In Terms of larger demands: With 64Bit/128Bit Instruction-set & the 32Bit SiMD/NANO/AVX128Bit+, + AES-NE + Advance Crypto Instruction ACI 96Bit * 5 /128Bit/256Bit/384Bit *3 AES/3DES/GEA * 3 Packets per nonce ICE-SSRTP * When it comes to pure security, We are grateful https://is.gd/SecurityHSM https://is.gd/WebPKI TLS Optimised https://drive.google.com/file/d/10XL19eGjxdCGj0tK8MULKlgWhHa9_5v9/view?usp=share_link Ethernet Security https://drive.google.com/file/d/18LNDcRSbqN7ubEzaO0pCsWaJHX68xCxf/view?usp=share_link These are the addresses directly of some good ones; DNS & NTP & PTP 2600:c05:3010:50:47::1 2607:fca8:b000:1::3 2607:fca8:b000:1::4 2a06:98c1:54::c12b 142.202.190.19 172.64.36.1 172.64.36.2 38.17.55.196 38.17.55.111 * #FreeRAND #Proverbs Random is made to be free, to be as free as a bird, it becomes the certificate of our freedom and is cherished as born free, As free as Random is! Born to be free; But Born forth freely by the angels of our seed. JN dev-rnd windows Nothing like leaching Rand from ubuntu! no not at all! but you can build pollinate and pollen for windows I would be greatful! thank you bill gates (as apps because windows update does not work for me & I built a dev/rnd for windows with a friend from a defence group before he disappeared!, be a hero bill) DiHARD This *Random* for your /dev/rnd *file* MiniSeed2023.zip https://drive.google.com/file/d/1LjUsVd6W38y0RPau7M7UyfUhoYsagxoC/view?usp=drive_web MiniSeed2023b.zip https://drive.google.com/file/d/14vs4xkD9QgtDhROcS5TDwGKDd4TxvloA/view?usp=drive_web MiniSeed2023c.zip https://drive.google.com/file/d/15CRO97oXsoAe7wdh6yYeHhJi9cKLfExs/view?usp=drive_web MiniSeed2023d.zip https://drive.google.com/file/d/12viSYnqwwzJh9jQdUuxDYO0mCwdHmxzM/view?usp=drive_web MiniSeed2023E.zip https://drive.google.com/file/d/1b1Jd4QTKB8-ADrtzikK73SXvQB0jZpiZ/view?usp=drive_web MiniSeed2023f.zip https://drive.google.com/file/d/1EYpbQdBSp-fmU1XTb9BrJoE9UyXKQpK1/view?usp=drive_web MiniSeed2023G.zip https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ZJLKjLrLfrdMxVCzNzKEw3DcDg__ZgE3/view?usp=drive_web Entropy / Chaos for /dev/rnd available whenever you like from https://pollinate2.n-helix.com/ https://pollinate.n-helix.com/ Constantly active rings if you do not know about Pollen & Pollinate ubuntu, google it! https://science.n-helix.com/2018/12/rng.html https://science.n-helix.com/2017/04/rng-and-random-web.html https://science.n-helix.com/2020/06/cryptoseed.html https://science.n-helix.com/2022/02/rdseed.html RS ***** ICE-SSRTP GEA Replacement 2022 + (c)RS IiCE-SSR for digital channel infrastructure can help heal GPRS+ 3G+ 4G+ 5G+ Time NTP Protocols : is usable in 2G+ <> 5G+LTE Network SIM ICE-SSRTP Encryption AES,Blake2, Poly ChaCha, SM4, SHA2, SHA3, GEA-1 and GEA-2 'Ideal for USB Dongle & Radio' in Rust RS ' Ideal for Quality TPM Implementation' "GEA-1 and GEA-2, which are very similar (GEA-2 is just an extension of GEA-1 with a higher amount of processing, and apparently not weakened) are bit-oriented stream ciphers." IiCE-SSRTP : Interleaved Inverted Signal Send & Receive Time Crystal Protocol Interleaved signals help Isolate noise from a Signal Send & Receive ... Overlapping inverted waves are a profile for complex audio & FFT is the result. Interleaved, Inverted & Compressed & a simple encryption? * Time differentiated : Interleave, Inversion & differentiating Elliptic curve. We will be able to know and test the Cypher : PRINCIPLE OF INTENT TO TRUST We know of a cypher but : (Principle RS) We blend the cypher.. Interleaved pages of a cypher obfuscate : PAL CScam does this Timed : Theoretically unique to you in principle for imprecision, But we cannot really have imprecise in Crypto! But we can have a set time & in effect Elliptic curve a transient variable T, With this, Interleave the resulting pages (RAM Buffer Concept) Invert them over Time Var = T We can do all & principally this is relatively simple. (c)RS * Modulus Dual Encrypt & Decrypt package : Processor feature (c)RS AES-CCM & AES-GCM & Other Cypher Modulus + CCM & GCM can be accelerated with a joint AES Crypto module, Processor feature & package : Module list: 2 Decryption pipelines working in parallel, With a Shared cache & RAM Module Modulus & Semi-parallel modulating decryption & Encryption combined with Encapsulation Cypher IP Protocol packet Parallax Cryptographic Processing Unit: RS The capacity To Multiply decryption on specific hardware in situations such as lower Bit precision is to be implemented as follows: On AES-NI & ARM Cryptographic processors; In particular PSP+PPS(ARM+) & SiMD .. The capacity to exploit the fact that the nonce is 16Bit to 64Bit & full float upto 128Bit for legal decryption (client) means there is a simple method to use: In situations that a AES-NI & ARM Cryptographic unit can process 2 threads on a 256Bit Function we can do both the main 128Bit/192Bit & the nonce 16Bit to 64Bit & Enable a single instruction Roll to Synchronise both The main HASH & Nonce. AES & Crypto hardware can utilise the CPU/GPU/Processor FPU & SiMD to decrypt the nonce (smaller so fast) & in the same 8bto to 64Bits of code; Inline & parallax the cryptographic function. With a 256Bit AES-NI & Cryptographic unit : Parallel Decryption & Return Encryption by using 2x 128Bit & a Processor Enciphered Nonce. * Security Relevant Extensions SVM : Elliptic Curves & Polynomial graphs & function AES : Advanced Encryption Standard Functions AVX : 32Bit to 256Bit parallel Vector Mathematics FPU : IEEE Float Maths F16b : 16Bit to 32Bit Standards Floats RDTSCP : Very high precision time & stamp Processor features: fpu vme de pse tsc msr pae mce cx8 apic sep mtrr pge mca cmov pat pse36 clflush mmx fxsr sse sse2 htt pni ssse3 fma cx16 sse4_1 sse4_2 popcnt aes f16c syscall nx lm avx svm sse4a osvw ibs xop skinit wdt lwp fma4 tce tbm topx page1gb rdtscp bmi1 32Bit SiMD Operations Available on AVX Per Cycle (A Thought on why 32Bit operations are good!) (8Cores)8*32Bit SiMD(AVX) * 6(times per cycle) * 3600Mhz = 1,382,400 Operations Per Second AES & Elliptic Hardware Acceleration : AES & SVM along with AVX Micro-block decoding. ECC Elliptic Curve encrypt is 20% to 40% more efficient than Large Size RSA AES on game packets @ QUICC 512/384/256 AES Elliptic is clearly advantageous because of compression block size on small network packets, Larger streams such as video clearly favour 2048 Bit RSA AES; With SVM Elliptic feature, RSA,512, 384 AES Elliptic curve is a clear winner! * (c)Rupert S *reference* https://science.n-helix.com/2022/02/interrupt-entropy.html https://science.n-helix.com/2022/03/ice-ssrtp.html https://science.n-helix.com/2022/01/ntp.html Performance Comparison of AES-CCM and AES-GCM Authenticated Encryption Modes http://worldcomp-proceedings.com/proc/p2016/SAM9746.pdf Basic comparison of Modes for Authenticated-Encryption -IAPM, XCBC, OCB, CCM, EAX, CWC, GCM, PCFB, CS https://www.fi.muni.cz/~xsvenda/docs/AE_comparison_ipics04.pdf * Example Encryption Results: gnutls-cli --benchmark-tls-ciphers Testing throughput in cipher/MAC combinations (payload: 1400 bytes) AES-128-GCM - TLS1.2 0.56 GB/sec AES-128-GCM - TLS1.3 0.57 GB/sec AES-128-CCM - TLS1.2 185.36 MB/sec AES-128-CCM - TLS1.3 182.74 MB/sec CHACHA20-POLY1305 - TLS1.2 112.79 MB/sec CHACHA20-POLY1305 - TLS1.3 111.61 MB/sec AES-128-CBC - TLS1.0 168.16 MB/sec CAMELLIA-128-CBC - TLS1.0 53.82 MB/sec GOST28147-TC26Z-CNT - TLS1.2 15.39 MB/sec As can be seen: AES-GCM is 1056x better than Camellia & 508x Better than ChaChaPoly 309x Better than AES-CCM So what about ChaChaGCM? RS * Example of use: Nostalgic TriBand : Independence RADIO : Send : Receive :Rebel-you trade marker Nostalgic TriBand 5hz banding 2 to 5 bands, Close proximity.. Interleaved channel BAND. Microchip clock and 50Mhz Risc Rio processor : 8Bit : 16Bit : 18Bit Coprocessor digital channel selector & channel Key selection based on unique.. Crystal time Quartz with Synced Tick (Regulated & modular) All digital interface and resistor ring channel & sync selector with micro band tuning firmware. (c)Rupert S * Good for cables ? and noise ? Presenting : IiCE-SSR for digital channel infrastructure & cables <Yes Even The Internet &+ Ethernet 5 Band> So the question of interleaved Bands & or signal inversion is a simple question but we have, SSD & HDD Cables & does signal inversion help us? Do interleaving bands help us? In Audio inversion would be a strange way to hear! but the inversion does help alleviate ... Transistor emission fatigue... IiCE-SSRTP : Interleaved Inverted Signal Send & Receive Time Crystal Protocol Interleaved signals help Isolate noise from a Signal Send & Receive ... Overlapping inverted waves are a profile for complex audio & FFT is the result. Interleaved, Inverted & Compressed & a simple encryption? Good for cables ? and noise ? Presenting : IiCE for digital channel infrastructure & cables <Yes Even The Internet &+ Ethernet 5 Band> (c) Rupert S * Given the ZFS Results the strategy to utilize (c)RS Crypto Storage & RAM Strategy (c)RS GCM : Accelerated by SVM Elliptic Curve & AES & ARM Crypto-Extensions, Processor Compression Accelerated, 2 to 64 Blocks, Header Separated; GZIP, BZip & LZ8 & LZH & Wavelet & Hardware Compression with independent Encrypted Segmentation & Sub-Grouping. Hash main block group listing & Tables for drive repair and DIR & Access Acceleration. https://www.medo64.com/content/media/ubuntu-2204-zfs-speed.png AES-128-GCM - TLS1.2 0.56 GB/sec AES-128-GCM - TLS1.3 0.57 GB/sec * https://science.n-helix.com/2018/12/rng.html https://science.n-helix.com/2022/02/rdseed.html https://science.n-helix.com/2017/04/rng-and-random-web.html https://science.n-helix.com/2022/02/interrupt-entropy.html https://science.n-helix.com/2021/11/monticarlo-workload-selector.html https://science.n-helix.com/2022/03/security-aspect-leaf-hash-identifiers.html Audio, Visual & Bluetooth & Headset & mobile developments only go so far: https://science.n-helix.com/2022/02/visual-acuity-of-eye-replacements.html https://science.n-helix.com/2022/03/ice-ssrtp.html https://science.n-helix.com/2021/11/ihmtes.html https://science.n-helix.com/2021/10/eccd-vr-3datmos-enhanced-codec.html https://science.n-helix.com/2021/11/wave-focus-anc.html https://science.n-helix.com/2021/12/3d-audio-plugin.html Integral to Telecoms Security TRNG *RAND OP Ubuntu : https://manpages.ubuntu.com/manpages/trusty/man1/pollinate.1.html https://pollinate.n-helix.com * ***** Dukes Of THRUST ****** Nostalgic TriBand : Independence RADIO : Send : Receive :Rebel-you trade markerz Nostalgic TriBand 5hz banding 2 to 5 bands, Close proximity.. Interleaved channel BAND. Microchip clock and 50Mhz Risc Rio processor : 8Bit : 16Bit : 18Bit Coprocessor digital channel selector & channel Key selection based on unique.. Crystal time Quartz with Synced Tick (Regulated & modular) All digital interface and resistor ring channel & sync selector with micro band tuning firmware. (c)Rupert S Dev/Random : Importance Dev/Random : Importance : Our C/T/RNG Can Help GEA-2 Open Software implementation of 3 Bits (T/RNG) Not 1 : We need Chaos : GEA-1 and GEA-2 Implementations we will improve with our /Dev/Random Our C/T/RNG Can Help GEA-2 Open Software implementation of 3 Bits (T/RNG) Not 1 : We need Chaos : GEA-1 and GEA-2 Implementations we will improve with our /Dev/Random We can improve GPRS 2G to 5G networks still need to save power, GPRS Doubles a phones capacity to run all day, Code can and will be improved, Proposals include: Blake2 ChaCha SM4 SHA2 SHA3 Elliptic Encipher AES Poly ChaCha Firstly we need a good solid & stable /dev/random So we can examine the issue with a true SEED! Rupert S https://science.n-helix.com/2022/02/interrupt-entropy.html TRNG Samples & Method DRAND Proud! https://drive.google.com/file/d/1b_Sl1oI7qTlc6__ihLt-N601nyLsY7QU/view?usp=drive_web https://drive.google.com/file/d/1yi4ERt0xdPc9ooh9vWrPY1LV_eXV-1Wc/view?usp=drive_web https://drive.google.com/file/d/11dKUNl0ngouSIJzOD92lO546tfGwC0tu/view?usp=drive_web https://drive.google.com/file/d/10a0E4Gh5S-itzBVh0fOaxS7JS9ru-68T/view?usp=drive_web https://github.com/P1sec/gea-implementation "GEA-1 and GEA-2, which are very similar (GEA-2 is just an extension of GEA-1 with a higher amount of processing, and apparently not weakened) are bit-oriented stream ciphers." "A stream cipher, such as the well-known RC4 or GEA-1, usually works through using the Xor operation against a plaintext. The Xor operation being symmetrical, this means that encrypting should be considered the same operation as decrypting: GEA-1 and GEA-2 are basically pseudo-random data generators, taking a seed (the key, IV and direction bit of the GPRS data, which are concatenated), The generated random data (the keystream) is xored with the clear-text data (the plaintext) for encrypting. Then, later, the keystream is xored with the encrypted data (the ciphertext) for decrypting. That is why the functions called in the target library for decrypting and encrypting are the same. GEA-1 and GEA-2 are bit-oriented, unlike RC4 which is byte-oriented, because their algorithms generate only one bit of pseudo-random data at once (derived from their internal state), while algorithms like RC4 generate no less than one byte at once (in RC4's case, derived from permutation done in its internal state). Even though the keystream bits are put together by the current encryption / decryption C and Rust libraries into bytes in order to generate usable keystream, obviously. Based on this, you can understand that GEA-1 and GEA-2 are LFSR: Linear Feedback Shift Register-oriented ciphers, because their internal state is stored into fixed-size registers. This includes the S and W registers which serve for initialization / key scheduling purposes and are respectively 64 and 97-bit wide registers, and the A, B, C (and for GEA-2 only D) registers which serve for the purpose of keystream generation, which are respectively 31, 32, 33 and 29-bit wide registers. On each iteration of the keystream generation, each register is bit-wise rotated by one position, while the bit being rotated from the left towards the right side (or conversely depending on in which bit order you internally represent your registers) is fed back to the algorithm and mutated depending on given conditions. Hence, the shifted-out bit is derived from other processing, and reinserted, while being for this reason possibly flipped depending on conditions depending on bits present at the other side of the given register. This is the explanation for the name of linear feedback shift register (shift because of the shift operation required for the rotation, and linear feedback because of the constant-time transform operation involved). The rest of the register may also be mutated at each iteration steps, as in the case of the GEA-1 and 2, whole fixed Xor sequences (which differ for each register) may be applied depending on whether the rotated bit is a 0 or a 1. Note that a step where the register iterates is called clocking (the register is clocked), and that the fixed points where the register may be Xor'ed when the rotated bit becomes a 1 are called taps. The linear function which may transmute the rotated bit at the clocking step (taking several bits of the original register as an input) is called the F function. Those kind of bit-oriented LFSR algorithms, such as GEA-1 and 2 (for GPRS) and A5/1 and 2 (for GSM), were designed this way for optimal hardware implementations in the late 80's and early 90's." ***** IiCE-SSRTP : Interleaved Inverted Signal Send & Receive Time Crystal Protocol Interleaved signals help Isolate noise from a Signal Send & Receive ... Overlapping inverted waves are a profile for complex audio & FFT is the result. Interleaved, Inverted & Compressed & a simple encryption? Good for cables ? and noise ? Presenting : IiCE-SSR for digital channel infrastructure & cables <Yes Even The Internet &+ Ethernet 5 Band> So the question of interleaved Bands & or signal inversion is a simple question but we have, SSD & HDD Cables & does signal inversion help us? Do interleaving bands help us? In Audio inversion would be a strange way to hear! but the inversion does help alleviate ... Transistor emission fatigue... IiCE-SSRTP : Interleaved Inverted Signal Send & Receive Time Crystal Protocol Interleaved signals help Isolate noise from a Signal Send & Receive ... Overlapping inverted waves are a profile for complex audio & FFT is the result. Interleaved, Inverted & Compressed & a simple encryption? Good for cables ? and noise ? Presenting : IiCE for digital channel infrastructure & cables <Yes Even The Internet &+ Ethernet 5 Band> (c) Rupert S ***** Dukes Of THRUST ****** Autism, Deafness & the hard of hearing : In need of ANC & Active audio clarification or correction 2022-01 Sony & a few others make noise cancelling headphones that are suitable for people with Acute disfunction to brain function for ear drums ... Attention deficit or Autism, The newer Sony headsets are theoretically enablers of a clear confusion free world for Autistic people.. Reaching out to a larger audience of people simply annoyed by a confusing world; While they listen to music.. Can and does protect a small percentage of people who are confused & harassed by major discord located in all jurisdictions of life... Crazy noise levels, Or simply drowned in HISSING Static: Search for active voice enhanced noise cancellation today. Rupert S https://science.n-helix.com https://science.n-helix.com/2021/11/wave-focus-anc.html https://science.n-helix.com/2021/10/noise-violation-technology-bluetooth.html https://www.orosound.com/ https://www.consumerreports.org/noise-canceling-headphone/best-noise-canceling-headphones-of-the-year-a1166868524/
- [TLS] Light-weight TLS & Elliptic security for as… Duke Abbaddon