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Re: [TLS] COMMENT: draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation

Steven Bellovin <smb@cs.columbia.edu> Wed, 16 December 2009 18:57 UTC

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From: Steven Bellovin <smb@cs.columbia.edu>
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Date: Wed, 16 Dec 2009 13:57:08 -0500
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To: Steve Dispensa <dispensa@phonefactor.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] COMMENT: draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation
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On Dec 15, 2009, at 10:11 AM, Steve Dispensa wrote:

> On 12/15/09 4:43 AM, "Ben Laurie" <benl@google.com> wrote:
>> On Mon, Dec 14, 2009 at 7:19 PM, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> wrote:
>>> Comment:
>>> 
>>>  As a protocol climbs the IETF standards-track maturity ladder, we
>>>  sometimes drop features.  I would rather see renegotiation dropped
>>>  from TLS than see this complexity added to TLS protocol.
>> 
>> That would break any website that does per-directory client
>> certificates. Which may not be many, but its far more than zero.
>> 
> Also, it breaks support for varying crypto strength requirements (e.g., some
> docs require DES/MD5, some require AES/SHA-1). I certainly wouldn't specify
> a new system this way, but I'm sure there are existing systems that do this.
> 
I'm hard-put to justify a protocol feature for that scenario.  It's not just improbable, it's probably bad application design -- the performance differences in the different algorithms are just too small to justify it, and we don't have to support it just to deal with this niche case.  Ben's scenario is more compelling and bears further thought.

		--Steve Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb

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