Re: [TLS] TLS process thread
Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com> Thu, 10 April 2014 08:14 UTC
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From: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
To: Sean Turner <TurnerS@ieca.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Apr 2014 10:14:00 +0200
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS process thread
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On Wed, 2014-04-09 at 16:49 -0400, Sean Turner wrote: > All, > > Thanks for your comments on the TLS 1.3 process. > > While the IETF certainly has used competitions in the past, they are > generally used to select one document from multiple starting points > and then the documents undergo substantial revisions. Even then, there > is a fairly mixed track record as WGs often find it very hard to come > to a final selection and instead get bogged down in the selection > process. Hello, That was not an issue with the selection of SSL 3.0, the document that was the basis of this working group. > In this case, however, our charter provides a clear starting point, > namely RFC 5246, and a mandate to minimize the changes to that > document. I am sorry, but I disagree. The charter proposed in [0], does not even mention RFC5246, and its points cannot possibly minimize the changes to RFC5246. It proposes the creation of a new protocol. For example: o Develop a mode that encrypts as much of the handshake as is possible to reduce the amount of observable data to both passive and active attackers. o Develop modes to reduce handshake latency, which primarily support HTTP-based applications, aiming for one roundtrip for a full handshake and one or zero roundtrip for repeated handshakes. The aim is also to maintain current security features. If these two are addressed in TLS 1.3, it will be a new protocol whether or not it was based on RFC5246. Even worse it will be a new cryptographic protocol designed in a working group that explicitly says it is not a working group of cryptographers. [0]. http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/charter-ietf-tls/ regards, Nikos
- [TLS] TLS process thread Sean Turner
- Re: [TLS] TLS process thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] TLS process thread Paul Hoffman
- Re: [TLS] TLS process thread Stephen Farrell
- Re: [TLS] TLS process thread Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] TLS process thread Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] TLS process thread Dan Harkins
- Re: [TLS] TLS process thread Brian Sniffen
- Re: [TLS] TLS process thread Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] TLS process thread Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] TLS process thread Trevor Perrin
- Re: [TLS] TLS process thread Douglas Stebila
- Re: [TLS] TLS process thread Klaus Hartke
- Re: [TLS] TLS process thread Paul Lambert