[TLS] Is client authentication allowed using PSK/SRP suites

Jack Lloyd <jack@randombit.net> Sun, 17 May 2020 11:46 UTC

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Date: Sun, 17 May 2020 07:46:46 -0400
From: Jack Lloyd <jack@randombit.net>
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Subject: [TLS] Is client authentication allowed using PSK/SRP suites
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RFC 5246 sec 7.4.4 states that "non-anonymous" servers can request a
client certificate, and otherwise attempting to request a certificate
should result in a fatal alert.

I would generally think of a handshake using PSK or SRP to not be
anonymous but rather the peer identity is implicitly verified via use
of the shared secret. But in this context I'm not sure that's the intent.

For purpose of 7.4.4 does "non-anonymous" mean:

- Anything besides a DH_anon_*/ECDH_anon_* ciphersuite

- A ciphersuite which involves the server sending a Certificate message.

- Something else?