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Re: [TLS] [Editorial Errata Reported] RFC8773 (7598)

Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> Wed, 16 August 2023 15:31 UTC

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From: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
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Date: Wed, 16 Aug 2023 11:30:58 -0400
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To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] [Editorial Errata Reported] RFC8773 (7598)
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Russ,

Yeah the change looks right. The server is selecting based on what’s in the ClientHello. Anybody else see it differently?

spt

> On Aug 11, 2023, at 12:35, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> wrote:
> 
> I believe thatthis errata should be verified.
> 
>> On Aug 11, 2023, at 12:23 PM, RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org> wrote:
>> 
>> The following errata report has been submitted for RFC8773,
>> "TLS 1.3 Extension for Certificate-Based Authentication with an External Pre-Shared Key".
>> 
>> --------------------------------------
>> You may review the report below and at:
>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid7598
>> 
>> --------------------------------------
>> Type: Editorial
>> Reported by: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
>> 
>> Section: 5.1
>> 
>> Original Text
>> -------------
>> When the "psk_key_exchange_modes" extension is included in the
>> ServerHello message, servers MUST select the psk_dhe_ke mode
>> for the initial handshake.
>> 
>> Corrected Text
>> --------------
>> When the "psk_key_exchange_modes" extension is included in the
>> ClientHello message, servers MUST select the psk_dhe_ke mode
>> for the initial handshake.
>> 
>> Notes
>> -----
>> According to RFC 8446, the "psk_key_exchange_modes" extension only appears in the ClientHello message. Further, the slides presented on this topic at IETF 101show the "psk_key_exchange_modes" extension in the ClientHello message and no other place.  It is pretty clear that this is an editorial error.
>> 
>> Instructions:
>> -------------
>> This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
>> use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
>> rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party  
>> can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. 
>> 
>> --------------------------------------
>> RFC8773 (draft-ietf-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk-07)
>> --------------------------------------
>> Title               : TLS 1.3 Extension for Certificate-Based Authentication with an External Pre-Shared Key
>> Publication Date    : March 2020
>> Author(s)           : R. Housley
>> Category            : EXPERIMENTAL
>> Source              : Transport Layer Security
>> Area                : Security
>> Stream              : IETF
>> Verifying Party     : IESG
> 
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