Re: [TLS] I know TLS Device & Radio & BT protocol, For such things as mice & keyboards & Game-Pads, Could propose AES & PSK, Can you see ECDHE Being used ? maybe Preshare & seeded PSK is better, Can we make a protocol TLS for devices ?

[Achim Kraus <[e-mail]>]

Hi Duke,

 > Can we make a protocol TLS for devices ?

did you consider to use DTLS?

 > Can you see ECDHE Being used ?

Once starting with ECDHE, in my experience the most seems to
prefer ECDSA. With RFC7250 the additional overhead is limited.

best regards
Achim

Am 06.02.23 um 03:11 schrieb Duke Abbaddon:
> I know TLS Device & Radio & BT protocol, For such things as mice &
> keyboards & Game-Pads, Could propose AES & PSK, Can you see ECDHE
> Being used ? maybe Preshare & seeded PSK is better, Can we make a
> protocol TLS for devices ?
>
> Rupert S
>
> Device Security CRT Initiations for URT, USB, Wireless & other Device
> Interactions : (c)RS
>
> A very good way to think about a mouse, Keyboard & device AES & Crypto
> security is that a device needs to be in the certificate store,
>
> Two reasons Hardware acceleration is OS Store & Security; The
> device(computer) specifically requests all interactions with the CRT
> with a level of privacy & security, By GUID Definition & identity;
> Secondly limiting the function to parameters so it will not hack the
> system..
>
> So firstly the device certificate needs to interact with a store for a
> temporary cert & therefore we need a device Certificate store that
> contains the equivalent of the Secure client key in SHELL,
>
> This does not need to worry us; But we need a store! if not the device
> driver needs to initiate the system Store DL & AES Systems so that the
> device is secured with a personal store & main key (probably
> ECC-AES-'GCM<>FF3-1' )
>
> Rupert S
>
> https://science.n-helix.com/2022/08/jit-dongle.html
>
> https://science.n-helix.com/2022/06/jit-compiler.html
>
> https://is.gd/LEDSource
> *****
>
> ((network server)Effectively Improves Phone & network SSL Connectivity
> & thus +security) (good for telecommunications networks) (TLS) My
> files are all verified by virustotal & are signed anyway!
> https://is.gd/SecurityHSM https://is.gd/WebPKI
>
> TLS Optimised https://drive.google.com/file/d/10XL19eGjxdCGj0tK8MULKlgWhHa9_5v9/view?usp=share_link
>
> Ethernet Security
> https://drive.google.com/file/d/18LNDcRSbqN7ubEzaO0pCsWaJHX68xCxf/view?usp=share_link
>
> RS
>
> *****
>
> ***********
>
> (in comparison Poly & AES is quite good for 32Bit USB Mice
> (small channel) Performance Evaluation Comparison LIGHTWEIGHT CIPHERS
> NIST LightWeight Cryptography Requirements : RS
>
> Lightweight Cryptography
> https://www.cryptrec.go.jp/report/cryptrec-gl-2003-2016en.pdf
> https://www.scitepress.org/papers/2014/49006/49006.pdf
>
> Performance Evaluation Comparison LIGHTWEIGHT CIPHERS NIST LightWeight
> Cryptography Requirements
> https://scholarworks.calstate.edu/downloads/k0698968b
>
> AES-NI Compatible Ciphers : AES, ARIA, CLEFIA
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-cipher-catalog-01#page-3
>
> CLEFIA : Large size table, Pure function
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6114
>
> ARIA : Random is a big+ to anomininity bit 128Bit's of data
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5794
> ARIA is conformant
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6209
> ARIA SRTP
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8269#page-14
>
> ************
>
>
> AES-GCM-SIV: Nonce Misuse-Resistant Authenticated Encryption
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8452/
>
> Adding the nonce to GMAC makes GMAC's unique : ICE-ssRTP
> https://www.zerotier.com/2019/09/04/aes-gmac-ctr-siv/
> https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5297#page-15
>
> Correct Time : EEC Elliptic & Nonce timer function:
>
> "The thing about random unique nonce with :dev/rng is that verifying
> the nonce's uniqueness is an issue, with SSRTP nonce, Time intrinsics
> allow only one play time https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8954/
>
> So what about if they have a reset phone & have not got the correct
> time ? mine wouldn't do NTP until i set it to pools.ntp.org, the
> telephone network would not change the time!"
>
> So the nonce may need a seconds from arrival timer; So that it is from
> the time it arrives (in your terms) & additionally a sent and arrival
> time so that when you get the correct time; It still works!
>
> In essence TLS & OSCP need a time from arrival (to verify
> link/Security CRT), It does not matter if that NTP timer is off by 5
> Minutes...
>
> you can use the Time related EEC Elliptic curve & as long as it is
> timed from arrival & sends back a sample with a from time & until...
>
> That EEC Elliptic & Nonce will work.
>
> RS
>
> *****
>
>
> https://science.n-helix.com/2022/03/ice-ssrtp.html
>
> Code Speed
> https://science.n-helix.com/2022/08/simd.html
> https://science.n-helix.com/2022/09/ovccans.html
>
> Chaos
> https://science.n-helix.com/2022/02/interrupt-entropy.html
> https://science.n-helix.com/2022/02/rdseed.html
> https://science.n-helix.com/2020/06/cryptoseed.html
>
> sRTP Chaos Nonce: Certificate transactions; TLS & OCSP Security Protocols
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8954/
>
> RSA-PSS
> RSASSA-PSS is a probabilistic signature scheme (PSS) with appendix
> RSAES-OAEP (Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding)
>
> https://www.cryptosys.net/pki/manpki/pki_rsaschemes.html
> https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8017
> https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5756
>
> PSK:
> Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suites for TLS with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois
> Counter Mode
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5487/
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8442/
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9258/
>
> Nonce & Plaintext, Token & SequenceID (Bearing in mind that ICE-SSRTP
> Nonce is compatible)
> https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-howard-gssapi-aead-01.txt
>
> AES-GCM-SIV: Nonce Misuse-Resistant Authenticated Encryption
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8452/
>
> Adding the nonce to GMAC makes GMAC's unique : ICE-ssRTP
> https://www.zerotier.com/2019/09/04/aes-gmac-ctr-siv/
> https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5297#page-15
>
> AES-GCM SRTP
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc7714/
> AES-CCM
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6655/
>
> Lightweight Cryptography
> https://www.cryptrec.go.jp/report/cryptrec-gl-2003-2016en.pdf
> https://www.scitepress.org/papers/2014/49006/49006.pdf
>
> Performance Evaluation Comparison LIGHTWEIGHT CIPHERS NIST LightWeight
> Cryptography Requirements
> https://scholarworks.calstate.edu/downloads/k0698968b
>
> TLS 1.3 on Lightweight Crypto
> https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/095.pdf
>
> Computation of Hilbert class polynomials and modular polynomials from
> super-singular elliptic curves
> https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/064.pdf
>
> Super-singular Elliptic Curves for ECDHE EEC PQC - Deuring for the
> People - Supersingular Elliptic Curves with Prescribed Endomorphism
> Ring in General Characteristic - 2023-106
> https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/106.pdf
>
> The Security of ChaCha20-Poly1305 in the Multi-user Setting
> https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/085.pdf
>
> Verification ECDHE
> ECDHE Grotto, framework & C++ library for space- & time-efficient
> -party piecewise polynomial 'i.e, spline' evaluation on secrets
> additively shared over, Grotto improves on the state-of-the-art
> approaches of DCF 2023-108
> https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/108.pdf
>
> AES-NI Compatible Ciphers : AES, ARIA, CLEFIA
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-cipher-catalog-01#page-3
>
> CLEFIA : Large size table, Pure function
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6114
>
> ARIA : Random is a big+ to anonymity bit 128Bit's of data
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5794
> ARIA is conformant
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6209
> ARIA SRTP
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8269#page-14
>
> Post Quantum:
> Verification of Correctness and Security Properties for CRYSTALS-KYBER
> https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/087.pdf
>
> Verification of the (1–δ)-Correctness Proof of CRYSTALS-KYBER with
> Number Theoretic Transform
> https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/027.pdf
>
> A Practical Template Attack on CRYSTALS-Dilithium
> https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/050.pdf
>
> NTRU, Kyber Hardware Acceleration - Gate-Level Masking of Streamlined
> NTRU Prime Decapsulation in Hardware 2023-105
> https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/105.pdf
>
> Compact TLS 1.3
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-ctls/
> DTLS 2023
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tsvwg-dtls-over-sctp-bis/
> TLS 1.2
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5246/
>
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/group/tls/about/
> https://blog.cloudflare.com/post-quantum-for-all/
>
> Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms Specification
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5905/
>
> https://science.n-helix.com/2022/01/ntp.html
>
> Securing TLS
> https://is.gd/SecurityHSM
> https://is.gd/WebPKI
>
> Crypto Libraries
> https://github.com/miracl/core
> https://github.com/jedisct1/libsodium
>
> About Circl library
> https://github.com/cloudflare/circl
> https://blog.cloudflare.com/inside-geo-key-manager-v2/
>
> FPGA & ASIC Libraries
> https://si2.org/open-cell-library/
>
> Model & Create S-Box (AES & ARIA & CLEFIA S-Box Modeling)
> AES & ARIA & CLEFIA S-Box Modeling - Advanced Crypto Algorithms -
> Modeling for Large S-boxes Oriented to Differential Probabilities and
> Linear Correlations (Long Paper) 2023-109
> https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/109.pdf
>
>
> *****
>
> Good stuff for all networks nation wide, the software is certificate
> signed & verified
> When it comes to pure security, We are grateful
> https://is.gd/SecurityHSM https://is.gd/WebPKI
> TLS Optimised https://drive.google.com/file/d/10XL19eGjxdCGj0tK8MULKlgWhHa9_5v9/view?usp=share_link
> Ethernet Security
> https://drive.google.com/file/d/18LNDcRSbqN7ubEzaO0pCsWaJHX68xCxf/view?usp=share_link
>
> These are the addresses directly of some good ones; DNS & NTP & PTP
> 2600:c05:3010:50:47::1 2607:fca8:b000:1::3 2607:fca8:b000:1::4
> 2a06:98c1:54::c12b 142.202.190.19 172.64.36.1 172.64.36.2 38.17.55.196
> 38.17.55.111
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> [e-mail]
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls