[TLS] Re: Status of ML-KEM WGLC

Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> Mon, 23 March 2026 06:39 UTC

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Date: Mon, 23 Mar 2026 17:39:22 +1100
From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
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References: <CAOgPGoDd=qhg-mGzB8mrFOGVKHY_9uz+_EO3P_i0_e8TG6v0Mw@mail.gmail.com> <acDQBdwmqyF8QGor@chardros.imrryr.org>
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Subject: [TLS] Re: Status of ML-KEM WGLC
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On Mon, Mar 23, 2026 at 04:30:45PM +1100, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:

> Given the extant IANA code points, and that support for non-hybrid
> ML-KEM is already present (though typically either or both not
> preferred, or enabled by default) in multiple TLS libraries, I see no
> rational motivation to oppose publication "in any form".  Surely, with
> appropriate caveats there's a way to get this specification published
> as an informational(!) RFC.
> 
> Blocking its publication changes little in practice, but creates some
> confusion about whether the specification is still subject to change,
> and may leave an impression that the IETF is out of touch. :-(

FWIW, by way of a mainstream reality check, the "gmail.com"
best-preference MX hosts accept "mlkem1024" by default (OpenSSL 3.5 and
later need to be explicitly coaxed to offer it):

    $ openssl s_client -brief -starttls smtp -CAfile /etc/pki/tls/cert.pem \
        -connect gmail-smtp-in.l.google.com:25 -groups mlkem1024
    Connecting to 142.251.12.27
    CONNECTION ESTABLISHED
    Protocol version: TLSv1.3
    Ciphersuite: TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
    Requested Signature Algorithms: ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256:rsa_pss_rsae_sha256:rsa_pkcs1_sha256:ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384:rsa_pss_rsae_sha384:rsa_pkcs1_sha384:rsa_pss_rsae_sha512:rsa_pkcs1_sha512:rsa_pkcs1_sha1
    Peer certificate: CN=mx.google.com
    Hash used: SHA256
    Signature type: ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
    Verification: OK
    Negotiated TLS1.3 group: MLKEM1024
    250 SMTPUTF8
    quit
    221 2.0.0 closing connection 41be03b00d2f7-c745e5d046csi13003379a12.253 - gsmtp

-- 
    Viktor.  🇺🇦 Слава Україні!