Re: [TLS] [pkix] Proposing CAA as PKIX Working Group Item

Michael D'Errico <mike-list@pobox.com> Thu, 02 June 2011 00:12 UTC

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Date: Wed, 01 Jun 2011 17:12:37 -0700
From: Michael D'Errico <mike-list@pobox.com>
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To: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
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Cc: pkix@ietf.org, TLS Mailing List <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] [pkix] Proposing CAA as PKIX Working Group Item
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Paul Hoffman wrote:
> 
> I support the PKIX WG adopting as a work item (wording taken from the CAA draft's text) "DNS Resource Records that allow a DNS domain name holder to specify the certificate signing certificate(s) authorized to issue certificates for that domain".

I haven't read the draft, but from the quote it appears that
this could improve the weakest part of TLS (as it is used
today in browsers) where any of the hundreds of preinstalled
root CAs is trusted to issue a certificate to any possible
domain name.

[CC'ed to the TLS working group]

Mike