Re: [TLS] early IANA code point assignment request for draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead

[Daniel Migault <[e-mail]>]

Hi,

I am not clear what the consensus is for the following points. Is there any
consensus for requesting the following ones?

BR,
Daniel

TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256   = {0xTBD; 0xTBD} {0xD0,0x01};
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384   = {0xTBD; 0xTBD} {0xD0,0x02};
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 = {0xTBD; 0xTBD} {0xD0,0x03};
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8_SHA384 = {0xTBD; 0xTBD} {0xD0,0x04};
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256   = {0xTBD; 0xTBD} {0xD0,0x05};
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_SHA384   = {0xTBD; 0xTBD} {0xD0,0x06};



On Sun, Oct 9, 2016 at 7:11 PM, Martin Thomson <[e-mail]>
wrote:

> I'm mainly just looking to economize on different configurations.
>
> On 9 October 2016 at 16:32, John Mattsson <[e-mail]>
> wrote:
> > Hi Martin,
> >
> >
> > AES_256_CCM_8 was not in the first versions of the draft but added later
> > after request from IoT people (probably afraid of quantum computers).
> >
> >
> > While I think it makes very much sense to have short tags in wireless
> > radio, I do not know how large need there is for AES-256 in IoT for
> > constrained devices, or how large the need would be to truncate the tag
> in
> > these cases.
> >
> >
> > My current understanding is that Grover’s algorithm may never be more
> > cost-effective than a cluster of classical computers, and that quantum
> > computers therefore likely do not affect the lifetime of AES-128.
> >
> >
> > I do not have any strong opinions regarding keeping AES_256_CCM_8 or not.
> > We should not give the impression that AES-256 is needed for practical
> > resistance to quantum computers anytime soon, it is however a requirement
> > for use by US government. Agree that AES_128_CCM_8 and AES_256_CCM seems
> > like the best choices in most cases.
> >
> >
> > Cheers,
> > John
> >
> >
> >
> > On 12/08/16 08:29, "TLS on behalf of Martin Thomson" <
> [e-mail]
> > on behalf of [e-mail]> wrote:
> >
> >>Looking at those emails, I am prompted to wonder if anyone can justify
> >>the existence of a ciphersuite with a double-sized key and half-sized
> >>authentication tag.  RFC 6655 doesn't really explain how that is a
> >>useful thing.
> >>
> >>On 10 August 2016 at 19:33, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <[e-mail]>
> >>wrote:
> >>> On Tue, 2016-08-09 at 14:45 -0400, Sean Turner wrote:
> >>>> All,
> >>>>
> >>>> We've received a request for early IANA assignments for the 6 cipher
> >>>> suites listed in https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-ecdh
> >>>> e-psk-aead/.  Please respond before August 23rd if you have concerns
> >>>> about early code point assignment for these cipher suites.
> >>>
> >>> I have previously raised an issue [0] on these ciphersuites. The same
> >>> requirement was noted also by Peter Dettman as something special in
> >>> [1]. However, there has been no reaction from the authors (now in CC).
> >>>
> >>> regards,
> >>> Nikos
> >>>
> >>> [0].
> >>>https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/4PZsc_Dy-aT299BYrlBKvZs0BOQ
> >>> [1].
> >>>https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/onEkdgH30eZgWs8v5Rp-CUqCHds
> >>>
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> >>
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