Re: [TLS] Session resumption ticket reuse considered harmful

Watson Ladd <watson@cloudflare.com> Thu, 05 March 2020 22:49 UTC

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From: Watson Ladd <watson@cloudflare.com>
Date: Thu, 05 Mar 2020 14:49:23 -0800
Message-ID: <CAN2QdAGja9JoXsSSnmdkjHk7kNbDpEiMVkPpA6VDCfRjo9DRVw@mail.gmail.com>
To: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
Cc: IETF TLS <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Session resumption ticket reuse considered harmful
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On Thu, Mar 5, 2020 at 12:55 PM Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> wrote:
>
> .... unless both parties agree.  It takes two to agree.

As far as I am aware session tickets being single use isn't enforced
by any server right now: it's a desirable but theoretical property for
0-RTT.

My skepticism is entirely a function of this being a late breaking
change to a relatively simple proposal, with not very much in the way
of quantifiable evidence to back up the concern that shared cache
contention is a big overhead. Is it 1%? .5? 10%? of the total time to
use a connection. At 10% we definitely need to do something, at .01%
we almost certainly don't.

>
> What are the problems with ticket reuse?  Well:
>
> 1) session linkage
>
> 2) early data doesn't get rekeyed, so you get key reuse and the early
>    data is replayable
>
> In the case of SMTP, however, (1) is not a problem for obvious reasons,
> and (2) is N/A.
>
> For SUBMIT, (1) is a problem, so don't allow it, and (2) is N/A.
>
> SMTP doesn't care about session linkage because it's MTA<->MTA traffic
> that is already aggregating multiple users' traffic, plus email is
> store-and-forward, so there is no real privacy loss for users.
>
> Nico
> --
>
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