Re: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-cert-abridge Update

"Kampanakis, Panos" <kpanos@amazon.com> Sat, 02 March 2024 04:10 UTC

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From: "Kampanakis, Panos" <kpanos@amazon.com>
To: Dennis Jackson <ietf=40dennis-jackson.uk@dmarc.ietf.org>, TLS List <tls@ietf.org>
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Date: Sat, 02 Mar 2024 04:09:59 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-cert-abridge Update
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Hi Dennis,

I created a git issue https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-cert-abridge/issues/23 but I am pasting it here for the sake of the discussion:

What does the client do if the server only does Pass 1 and compresses / omits the chain certs but does not compress the end-entity certs (Pass 2)?

The client should be fine with that. It should be able to reconstruct the chain and used the uncompressed end-entity cert. It should not fail the handshake. I suggest the Implementation Complexity Section to say something like

> Servers MAY chose to compress just the cert chain or the end-certificate depending on their ability to perform Pass 1 or 2 respectively. Client MUST be able to process a compressed chain or an end-entity certificate independently.

Thanks,
Panos


From: TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Dennis Jackson
Sent: Friday, March 1, 2024 8:03 AM
To: TLS List <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-cert-abridge Update


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Hi all,

I wanted to give a quick update on the draft.

On the implementation side, we have now landed support for TLS Certificate Compression in Firefox Nightly which was a prerequisite for experimenting with this scheme (thank you to Anna Weine). We're working on a rust crate implementing the current draft and expect to start experimenting with abridged certs in Firefox (with a server-side partner) ahead of IETF 120.

On the editorial side, I've addressed the comments on presentation and clarification made since IETF 117 which are now in the editors copy - there's an overall diff here [1] and atomic changes here [2] . There are two small PRs I've opened addressing minor comments by Ben Schwarz on fingerprinting considerations [3] and Jared Crawford on the ordering of certificates [4]. Feedback is welcome via mail or on the PRs directly.

Best,
Dennis

[1] https://author-tools.ietf.org/api/iddiff?doc_1=draft-ietf-tls-cert-abridge&url_2=https://tlswg.github.io/draft-ietf-tls-cert-abridge/draft-ietf-tls-cert-abridge.txt

[2] https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-cert-abridge/commits/main/

[3] https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-cert-abridge/pull/21/files

[4] https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-cert-abridge/pull/19/files