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Re: [TLS] Design Alternatives for Kerberos + DH

Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> Fri, 16 October 2015 18:48 UTC

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Date: Fri, 16 Oct 2015 14:48:26 -0400
From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: Rick van Rein <rick@openfortress.nl>
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Cc: tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] Design Alternatives for Kerberos + DH
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On Fri, 16 Oct 2015, Rick van Rein wrote:

> 3) Similar to OpenPGP: Negotiate cert-type
>
> There is a cert-type for X.509 and for OpenPGP; add one for Kerberos Tickets.
>
> PRO: Good integration with TLS: Tickets are transported in the ClientCertificate, and an Authenticator is the ClientVerify.  DH is independent and can move to the earlier phase for TLS 1.3.

How is this type of TLS connection prevented from being MITM'ed by
someone replaying kerberos tickets (which it cannot read itself)

Paul

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