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[TLS] Why again can't we use TLS signing certs to create short-lived sub-certs?

Bill Cox <waywardgeek@google.com> Wed, 30 March 2016 09:47 UTC

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Date: Wed, 30 Mar 2016 02:46:55 -0700
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From: Bill Cox <waywardgeek@google.com>
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Subject: [TLS] Why again can't we use TLS signing certs to create short-lived sub-certs?
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IIRC, TLS 1.3 will not offer big companies the ability to create
short-lived sub-certificates specific to remote satellite locations.  This
forces companies to choose between good physical security for their signing
certs, or having fast connection times.  Am I recalling correctly that TLS
1.3 has this problem?  I thought we fixed this in QUIC crypto.

Thanks,
Bill

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