Re: [TLS] Last Call: draft-ietf-tls-rfc4366-bis (Transport Layer

Martin Rex <Martin.Rex@sap.com> Wed, 30 September 2009 14:52 UTC

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From: Martin Rex <Martin.Rex@sap.com>
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To: uri@ll.mit.edu (Blumenthal Uri)
Date: Wed, 30 Sep 2009 16:54:14 +0200 (MEST)
In-Reply-To: <90E934FC4BBC1946B3C27E673B4DB0E4A7E75F6BA3@LLE2K7-BE01.mitll.ad.local> from "Blumenthal, Uri" at Sep 30, 9 10:07:12 am
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Cc: tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] Last Call: draft-ietf-tls-rfc4366-bis (Transport Layer
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Blumenthal, Uri wrote:
> 
> In my understanding, TLS-established server_name should be
> enforced by the server.
> 
> And Martin - I couldn't disagree more with you. The whole point of
> using TLS is to enforce who can access what. So the client makes sure
> he accesses the right server, the server makes sure he grants access
> to the right pages on the right virtual host. And if your server
> doesn't do that - please kindly tell me what commercial or
> freeware product it is included in, so I can avoid buying or
> using it in the future.

There seems to be a significant misunderstanding.

The Host header field of an HTTP request is a detail of an
application protocol.  The hostname conveyed by the TLS extension
server name indication (SNI) happens at a competely different
protocol layer.

The difference becomes obvious when you add reverse proxies
into the picture (those which terminate the TLS wrapping).

Conceptually, the Host: header field of a HTTP request is
part of the URL.  If a reverse proxy perform URL rewriting,
it may as well have to rewrite Host: header fields.  That
depends entirely on the backend architecture of each
particular software installation.


Whether or not an application may want to make consistency
checks between a Host: Header field and a hostname received
via SNI at the specific point of the backend architecture
where TLS was terminated depends entirely on the backend
architecture, and is an application issue.


-Martin