Re: [TLS] I-D: CipherSuites for Kerberos + DH

This seems like a good approach.

-Ekr

On Sun, Oct 11, 2015 at 6:46 AM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Sun, Oct 11, 2015 at 8:17 AM, Ilari Liusvaara
> <ilariliusvaara@welho.com> wrote:
> > On Sun, Oct 11, 2015 at 09:25:10AM +0200, Rick van Rein wrote:
> >> > *From:* internet-drafts@ietf.org
> >> >
> >> > Name:               draft-vanrein-tls-kdh
> >> > Revision:   00
> >>
> >> Hello TLS WG,
> >>
> >> I would like to propose new CipherSuites for TLS.  The cryptography is
> >> founded on Kerberos authentication and DH encryption, cryptographically
> >> bound together.  The mechanism uses mutual authentication, although
> >> clients may use anonymous tickets.
> >>
> >> Any feedback that you may have (technical, or WG-procedural) is kindly
> >> welcomed.  I will also send this to the Kitten WG.
> >
> > Some quick comments:
> > - The signed DH share does not look to be bound to anything (crypto
> >   parameters negotiation, randoms, server key exchange, etc..). I can't
> >   offhand say what that would lead to, but it looks even worse than
> >   TLS ServerKeyExchange, which has known vulernabilities due to
> >   lack of binding to things like ciphersuite.
> > - The ciphersuite list looks bad: 1) IDEA (bad idea), CBC
> >   (don't use), apparent SHA-1 prf-hash (REALLY bad idea)[1][2].
> > - Even use of DH is questionable.
>
> I would suggest piggybacking on the PSK mode, using the key Kerberos
> provides at both ends as the PSK key. This would address all of these
> issues in TLS 1.3
>
> Sincerely,
> Watson
>
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