[TLS] Subject: Re: I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-rfc8447bis-02.txt - Space & Aviation & Shipping & GSM https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mattsson-tls-psk-ke-dont-dont-dont/

[Duke Abbaddon <[e-mail]>]

Subject: Re: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-rfc8447bis-02.txt -
Space & Aviation & Shipping & GSM

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mattsson-tls-psk-ke-dont-dont-dont/

I would like to point out that :

PSK_PSK could use Elliptic PSK for PSK1(encapsulation : EEC, AES, GCM)
& PSK as a certificate replacement (the PSK would have to be a
HASH:RSA, AES For example)

There are two fundamental uses for PSK; Voyager is an example (NASA);
Where a long voyage in space does not allow a long range high latency
connection to verify certificate chain & Certificate verification is
not recommended (7Years)!

Shipping Radio and GSM & Global positioning : Open PSK from space

The use of Registered Certificates for these jobs helps; When making a
Sub-Certificate verify depends on reliable certificate verification &
distance counts in Aviation
(can work though but must not verify with an offsite server for secrecy)

Static (Self updated by firmware) Certificates work for the ECDHE_CERT
pairing or the PSK_DHE/ECDHE (certificate) pairing, However
verification on first initiation is Local

(c)Rupert S
*****

Reference : Subject: [TLS] Security of using same cert for TLS client and server
Message-ID:1,
Commenting on {PSK : SHA3 'various'} : RS

PSK AnonyCRT (c)RS

PSK & AnonySecureCERT & TPM Client CRT & Anonymous Identity Email/Site
Cert Identity (Replace PSK with one of them)

PSK is usable for initial Key exchange if the PSK ID is loaded from
the certificate provider, The cloud Provider or the Source Server; If
the initial PSK is for example 8 Characters sent compressed & encoded
with an Open EEC Certificate that the Browser or application uses....

One may be thinking; what the hell? Well the idea is to provide a list
of PSK's with a time function &or a message count (so the next PSK can
be loaded..

The reasoning is, We can use the PSK from the Client/Server side to
guarantee & Secure sent data,
So essentially if a PSK is regarded as an elliptic curve initiator
code; We can use any EEC we like from a PSK,

We can for example use a certificate-less TLS by initiating 2 PSK per
round (segment of time),
We can check NTP Sync with Time Protocol on send & receive of PSK/CERT/EEC

1 PSK is EEC Curve
2 PSK is CERT HASH (EEC, RSA, AES, PolySHA, GEA)

This provides a time limited window to decode & anonymity.

PSK
AnonySecureCERT
TPM Client CRT
Anonymous Identity Email/Site Cert

The idea being the Server can verify the correct receiver of TDP / UDP
/ DNS / NTP & other internet protocols such as Ethernet routing

Initiate an identity of Hash Classifiers : SHA2, SHA3 & use the best
with the same bit rate listed as supported? Blake is linux approved in
the /dev/rnd RNG

Rupert S

Reference : Subject: [TLS] Security of using same cert for TLS client and server
Message-ID:1

"Message: 1
Date: Fri, 27 Jan 2023 18:01:04 +0000
From: John Mattsson <[e-mail]>
To: "[e-mail]" <[e-mail]>
Subject: [TLS] Security of using same cert for TLS client and server
Message-ID:
        <[e-mail]>

Content-Type: text/plain; charset="windows-1252"

Hi,

TLS WG went through a lot of work (RFC 9258) to make sure that PSKs
only be used with a single hash function. But as far as I can see the
RFC8446(bis) does not say anything about:


  *   Using the same cert for TLS client and TLS server
  *   Using the same public key cert for TLS and another protocol
(JOSE, COSE, SMIME, IKE, etc, ?.)
  *   Using the external PSK for TLS and another protocol.

I think it should.

- Using the same signature key or PSK for TLS and another protocol is
obviously unsecure in the worst case. But probably practically secure
in many cases even if nobody has proved it.

- Did any of the formal analysis prove that using the same key for TLS
client and server is secure? It is quite common that the same node is
a TLS server and client.

Cheers,
John"

*****

For easy testing and advantage, the following setups & software are provided

PQS & TLS Reference material, In reference to this document
tls-parameters, This is my potential parameters list for the group to
work on

# https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml

Rupert S

https://science.n-helix.com/2022/03/ice-ssrtp.html

Code Speed
https://science.n-helix.com/2022/08/simd.html
https://science.n-helix.com/2022/09/ovccans.html

Chaos
https://science.n-helix.com/2022/02/interrupt-entropy.html
https://science.n-helix.com/2022/02/rdseed.html
https://science.n-helix.com/2020/06/cryptoseed.html

When it comes to pure security, We are grateful
https://is.gd/SecurityHSM https://is.gd/WebPKI

TLS Optimised
https://drive.google.com/file/d/10XL19eGjxdCGj0tK8MULKlgWhHa9_5v9/view?usp=share_link

Ethernet Security
https://drive.google.com/file/d/18LNDcRSbqN7ubEzaO0pCsWaJHX68xCxf/view?usp=share_link

These are the addresses directly of some good ones; DNS & NTP & PTP
2600:c05:3010:50:47::1 2607:fca8:b000:1::3 2607:fca8:b000:1::4
2a06:98c1:54::c12b
142.202.190.19 172.64.36.1 172.64.36.2 38.17.55.196 38.17.55.111