[TLS] Roman Danyliw's Yes on draft-ietf-tls-esni-24: (with COMMENT)

Roman Danyliw via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org> Fri, 02 May 2025 14:08 UTC

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From: Roman Danyliw via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org>
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Date: Fri, 02 May 2025 07:08:40 -0700
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CC: draft-ietf-tls-esni@ietf.org, tls-chairs@ietf.org, tls@ietf.org, jsalowey@gmail.com
Reply-To: Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org>
Subject: [TLS] Roman Danyliw's Yes on draft-ietf-tls-esni-24: (with COMMENT)
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/xuJ96gxO2ZBAwSLWDVqKPUMPAWI>

Roman Danyliw has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-tls-esni-24: Yes

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COMMENT:
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Thank you to Pete Resnick for the GENART review.

** Section 8.2. Recommend explicitly documenting that the WG considered the
impact of ECH’s design to current operational security practices. There was
feedback after the publication of TLS v1.3 that such practices were not
considered (even though they were).

OLD
Some use cases which depend on information ECH encrypts may break
with the deployment of ECH.

NEW (roughly)

Some use cases which depend on information ECH encrypt may break with the
deployment of ECH. This includes operational security practices in the
enterprise that depend on the SNI for policy enforcement, audit or network
visibility.

** From idnits:

** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 6125 (Obsoleted by RFC 9525)

Should RFC9525 be used instead of RFC6125 in Section 6.1.7? Not, why not?

[TLS] Roman Danyliw's Yes on draft-ietf-tls-esni-… Roman Danyliw via Datatracker