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Re: [TLS] Signature Algorithms

Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com> Tue, 17 March 2015 18:27 UTC

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From: Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 14:27:45 -0400
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Signature Algorithms
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On Tue, Mar 17, 2015 at 10:41 AM, Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com> wrote:
> What's the viability of having TLS 1.3 drop support for SHA-1 for
> end-entity certificates? (not root or intermediary, yet)

On Tuesday, March 17, 2015 01:59:58 pm Eric Rescorla wrote:
> I would not be in favor of this. Many people have certificates with very long lifetimes
> and this would effectively mean that people could not drop in TLS 1.3 for
> 1.2 on their servers, which would be bad.

On Tuesday, March 17, 2015 01:51:06 pm Mehner, Carl wrote:
> My thoughts were that this would happen on or after the sunset date
> (2017-01-01). Dropping SHA-1 for EE-certs is not something I am looking to
> have mandated in this document, just allowed for.

Ok, then putting strict sunset dates into the specification could be a good route instead.


Dave

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