Re: [TLS] TLS or HTTP issue?

Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org> Thu, 12 November 2009 18:43 UTC

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Sender: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <n.mavrogiannopoulos@gmail.com>
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Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2009 20:44:09 +0200
From: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org>
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To: Chris Newman <Chris.Newman@Sun.COM>
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Cc: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS or HTTP issue?
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Chris Newman wrote:

> 2. Having one authorized and authenticated TLS session decrypt data from
> a different TLS session.  This attack is most severe for
> SMTP+STARTTLS+BDAT (since SMTP relays typically treat all senders as
> authenticated as long as the recipient is in the local domain), but
> impacts most application protocols that have a command to "send",
> "post", "put", "set an attribute" or perform any write operation that
> can subsequently be read back.  In the case of IMAP, this can be used by
> one authorized IMAP user (someone with an account on the IMAP server) to
> potentially steal the login password of another IMAP user on the same
> server (with some IMAP client behavior caveats).

This attack is not obvious to me by this description. Can you please
elaborate?


regards,
Nikos