[Tm-rid] IETF trustworthy IDs alternatives for tm-rid
Robert Moskowitz <rgm@labs.htt-consult.com> Thu, 17 October 2019 13:22 UTC
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From: Robert Moskowitz <rgm@labs.htt-consult.com>
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Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2019 09:21:55 -0400
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Subject: [Tm-rid] IETF trustworthy IDs alternatives for tm-rid
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Eric challenged me to show why HIP/HITs for UAS RemoteID, and not something else in the IETF toolbox, so here goes: Just a couple of requirements: 1) The ID MUST be 20 bytes or smaller. 2) It MUST be non-spoofable within the context of RemoteID broadcast messages (some collection of messages provides proof of UA ownership of ID). 3) In context (that is in a RemoteID broadcast message), just the ID provides enough information on how at least the observer's USS (UAS Service Supplier) can provide both public and private information on the UAS. Now a little 'context' setting. ASTM has already defined a set of textual RemoteIDs: 1: Serial Number (ANSI/CTA-2063) 2: CAA Assigned ID 3: UTM Assigned ID (UUID RFC4122) The work here MUST surpass these in terms of Trustworthy. The options I have found in my research over the past couple weeks (and please add your knowledge to the list): 1) X.509 certs where something like the cert sequenceNumber is the RemoteID 2) RFC 6920 (Naming Things with Hashes), sec 8.2 3) SSH keyID 4) HIT (Host Identity Tag) Option 1 is no better than what ASTM/FAA is considering for any of the current proposed types. Somehow, there will be a PKI and from that knowledge of the UAS is gained. This REQUIRES Internet Access (think disaster or other non-Internet situations) and a GLOBAL PKI (the UA flew from Canada to the US or UK to France post Brexit). Option 2 meets requirements 1 & 2, but needs to be augmented so that the Hash provides context for 3. Is it supported for IPsec and/or QUIC for UAS/observer secure communications (phase 2). Option 3 is similar to 2, but has a significant collision issue for global use. Option 4 is similar to 2, but needs significantly less augmentation. If I look at the work to make any of these a real value-add to US Remote/NetworkID, my money is on HIT/HIP as the most complete. More details to follow in the ID that Stu and I are supposedly writing and for the BOF. Bob
- [Tm-rid] IETF trustworthy IDs alternatives for tm… Robert Moskowitz