[Drip] Re: Google's "AI" is mostly right & positive about DETs

[Stu Card <[e-mail]>]

Or if your employer is skittish about accessing such things, here is what I got just now, mostly plain text, some HTTP[S] links to references.

==

UTM-system-assigned Universally Unique Identifiers (UUIDs) and IETF Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP) Entity Tags (DETs) are both designed to uniquely identify unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) for Remote ID (RID) and traffic management, but they differ significantly in trust, structure, and capability. While UTM UUIDs are often random identifiers assigned by a service provider, DETs are cryptographic, hierarchical identifiers that provide built-in, trustable, and verifiable ownership of the identity. [1<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9374/>, 2<http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2:1851520>, 3<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-drip-arch-31.html>, 4<https://www.privado.id/blog/privado-id-launches-identity-verification-for-apps-in-app-zero-install-human-verification-50-faster#:~:text=Is%20cryptographically%20derived%20from%20the%20Universal%20Unique%20Identifier%20(UUID).>, 5<https://www.warp10.io/content/03_Documentation/05_Security/03_Token_Management#:~:text=Each%20owner%20is%20identified%20by%20a%20UUID.>]

UTM System Assigned UUID (Type 3)

  *   Definition: A random, temporary ID assigned by a UAS Service Supplier (USS) to a specific operation.
  *   Purpose: Primarily for managing identification during a single flight, often to protect operator privacy.
  *   Characteristics:
     *   Generation: Follows RFC 4122 (UUID v4).
     *   Trust: Does not inherently prove that the UAS broadcasting the ID is actually the one authorized to use it (susceptible to spoofing unless combined with other security measures).
     *   Use Case: Ideal for temporary operational, anonymous IDs. [6<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-drip-arch-00.html>, 7<https://grahamsutton.dev/laravel-prefixed-ulids-generate-stripe-style-obfuscated-ids-for-your-app/#:~:text=Unlike%20UUIDs%2C%20which%20you%20are%20probably%20more,create%20a%20unique%20ID%20that%20is%20sortable.>, 8<https://www.hjp.at/doc/rfc/rfc9153.html#:~:text=USS%20also%20serve%20as%20the%20principal%2C%20or,its%20operator%20in%20at%20least%20one%20USS.>, 9<https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/12/31/2019-28100/remote-identification-of-unmanned-aircraft-systems#:~:text=A%20session%20ID%20would%20be%20a%20randomly%2Dgenerated,to%20provide%20a%20greater%20level%20of%20privacy.>, 10<https://par.nsf.gov/servlets/purl/10213236#:~:text=As%20a%20result%2C%20it%20is%20vulnerable%20to,airspace%20with%20one%20or%20more%20fake%20identities.>]
IETF DRIP Entity Tag (DET)

  *   Definition: A 128-bit Hierarchical Host Identity Tag (HHIT) used specifically in UAS Remote Identification.
  *   Purpose: To make Remote ID instantly actionable, secure, and trustable (non-repudiable) even in offline/broadcast scenarios.
  *   Characteristics:
     *   Cryptographic: DETs are derived from public keys.
     *   Verifiable: An observer can verify the UAS holds the corresponding private key, proving the ID is not spoofed.
     *   Hierarchical: Contains structure (Hierarchy ID) enabling discovery of the registry where the drone is registered via DNS.
     *   Statistically Unique: Uses second-preimage resistance for uniqueness.
     *   Use Case: Critical infrastructure requiring high security, trust, and accountability. [1<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9374/>, 11<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-wiethuechter-drip-det-tada-01.html#:~:text=Abstract.%20This%20document%20standardizes%20usage%20of%20Drone,accountability%2C%20and%20encryption%20key%20IDs%20for%20confidentiality.>, 12<https://tex2e.github.io/rfc-translater/html/rfc9374.html#:~:text=This%20RFC%20is%20a%20foundational%20document%20of,%5BRFC9224%5D)%20for%203rd%2Dparty%20identification%20endorsement%20(e.g.%2C%20%5BDRIP%2DAUTH%5D).>, 13<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9153.html>, 14<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-drip-arch-22.html>, 15<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-drip-reqs-03.html>]
Key Comparison
Feature [1<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9374/>, 11<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-wiethuechter-drip-det-tada-01.html#:~:text=Abstract.%20This%20document%20standardizes%20usage%20of%20Drone,accountability%2C%20and%20encryption%20key%20IDs%20for%20confidentiality.>, 14<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-drip-arch-22.html>, 16<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-drip-reqs-00.html>, 17<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9374.pdf>, 18<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-card-drip-arch-02>]
UTM Assigned UUID
IETF DRIP Entity Tag (DET)
Type
Generic UUID (v4)
Cryptographic Hash (HHIT)
Trust Model
Trust by registration
Trust by verification (Cryptographic)
Non-spoofable
No (without external signing)
Yes (when combined with AUTH)
Hierarchy
None (Flat)
Yes (contains RAA/HDA)
Length
128 bits
128 bits (represented as IPv6)
Registry Lookup
Requires proprietary database
DNS-based
Primary Value
Privacy/Temporary
Security/Trustworthy

Summary

While a UTM-assigned UUID is a simple label, a DET is a self-asserting identifier that allows observers to verify the identity and, via DNS, check its registration status, even without an active internet connection at the time of observation. The IETF DRIP architecture leverages DETs to provide a secure alternative to simple random, non-cryptographic IDs. [2<http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2:1851520>, 15<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-drip-reqs-03.html>, 19<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-drip-rid/37/#:~:text=Gurtov%20Link%C3%B6ping%20University%202%20December%202022%20DRIP,RID).%20This%20document%20updates%20RFC7401%20and%20RFC7343.>, 20<https://www.mdpi.com/2079-9292/13/12/2370#:~:text=DT%20classifies%20nodes%20based%20on%20attributes%20or,users%20and%20detecting%20spoofing%20across%20various%20scenarios.>, 21<https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10467167/#:~:text=However%2C%20the%20Internet%20Engineering%20Task%20Force%20(IETF,without%20needing%20an%20external%2C%20internet%2Dbased%20verification%20service.>]

AI responses may include mistakes.
[1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9374/
[2] http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2:1851520
[3] https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-drip-arch-31.html
[4] https://www.privado.id/blog/privado-id-launches-identity-verification-for-apps-in-app-zero-install-human-verification-50-faster<https://www.privado.id/blog/privado-id-launches-identity-verification-for-apps-in-app-zero-install-human-verification-50-faster#:~:text=Is%20cryptographically%20derived%20from%20the%20Universal%20Unique%20Identifier%20(UUID).>
[5] https://www.warp10.io/content/03_Documentation/05_Security/03_Token_Management<https://www.warp10.io/content/03_Documentation/05_Security/03_Token_Management#:~:text=Each%20owner%20is%20identified%20by%20a%20UUID.>
[6] https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-drip-arch-00.html
[7] https://grahamsutton.dev/laravel-prefixed-ulids-generate-stripe-style-obfuscated-ids-for-your-app/<https://grahamsutton.dev/laravel-prefixed-ulids-generate-stripe-style-obfuscated-ids-for-your-app/#:~:text=Unlike%20UUIDs%2C%20which%20you%20are%20probably%20more,create%20a%20unique%20ID%20that%20is%20sortable.>
[8] https://www.hjp.at/doc/rfc/rfc9153.html<https://www.hjp.at/doc/rfc/rfc9153.html#:~:text=USS%20also%20serve%20as%20the%20principal%2C%20or,its%20operator%20in%20at%20least%20one%20USS.>
[9] https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/12/31/2019-28100/remote-identification-of-unmanned-aircraft-systems<https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/12/31/2019-28100/remote-identification-of-unmanned-aircraft-systems#:~:text=A%20session%20ID%20would%20be%20a%20randomly%2Dgenerated,to%20provide%20a%20greater%20level%20of%20privacy.>
[10] https://par.nsf.gov/servlets/purl/10213236<https://par.nsf.gov/servlets/purl/10213236#:~:text=As%20a%20result%2C%20it%20is%20vulnerable%20to,airspace%20with%20one%20or%20more%20fake%20identities.>
[11] https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-wiethuechter-drip-det-tada-01.html<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-wiethuechter-drip-det-tada-01.html#:~:text=Abstract.%20This%20document%20standardizes%20usage%20of%20Drone,accountability%2C%20and%20encryption%20key%20IDs%20for%20confidentiality.>
[12] https://tex2e.github.io/rfc-translater/html/rfc9374.html<https://tex2e.github.io/rfc-translater/html/rfc9374.html#:~:text=This%20RFC%20is%20a%20foundational%20document%20of,%5BRFC9224%5D)%20for%203rd%2Dparty%20identification%20endorsement%20(e.g.%2C%20%5BDRIP%2DAUTH%5D).>
[13] https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9153.html
[14] https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-drip-arch-22.html
[15] https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-drip-reqs-03.html
[16] https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-drip-reqs-00.html
[17] https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9374.pdf
[18] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-card-drip-arch-02
[19] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-drip-rid/37/<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-drip-rid/37/#:~:text=Gurtov%20Link%C3%B6ping%20University%202%20December%202022%20DRIP,RID).%20This%20document%20updates%20RFC7401%20and%20RFC7343.>
[20] https://www.mdpi.com/2079-9292/13/12/2370<https://www.mdpi.com/2079-9292/13/12/2370#:~:text=DT%20classifies%20nodes%20based%20on%20attributes%20or,users%20and%20detecting%20spoofing%20across%20various%20scenarios.>
[21] https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10467167/<https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10467167/#:~:text=However%2C%20the%20Internet%20Engineering%20Task%20Force%20(IETF,without%20needing%20an%20external%2C%20internet%2Dbased%20verification%20service.>




From: Stu Card <[e-mail]>
Sent: Tuesday, February 24, 2026 1:24 PM
To: DRIP WG <[e-mail]>
Subject: [Drip] Google's "AI" is mostly right & positive about DETs

Google this and be happy with the “AI Overview”. 😊

UTM system assigned UUID vs IETF DRIP Entity Tag