[tram] Review of draft-johnston-tram-stun-origin-02

Marc Petit-Huguenin <marcph@getjive.com> Tue, 06 May 2014 10:55 UTC

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Date: Tue, 06 May 2014 04:55:12 -0600
From: Marc Petit-Huguenin <marcph@getjive.com>
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Subject: [tram] Review of draft-johnston-tram-stun-origin-02
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A1. Intended Status: Informational

Shouldn't this be Standard Track?

A2. Section 1, 2nd paragraph, last sentence: "as generating the response..."

I do not think that the reason for no authentication for the NAT
Discovery Usage is because it is less work, but because there is no
resource to protect so adding more work does not make sense.

A3. Section 1, 8th paragraph

I do not think that the ORIGIN should be used to select the certificate
when (D)TLS is used.  First it does not work with DANE, as when an SRV
(and probably NAPTR too, but that's undefined yet) RR redirects to a
different domain, the domain to be checked with is the host name, not
the service domain (see draft-ietf-dane-srv).  For non-DANE cases, I
think that the correct way to select the certificate is to use SNI.

So I would suggest to restrict the normative use of ORIGIN only to
select realms.

A4. Section 2.2. ORIGIN attribute usage

The text does not say if the ORIGIN attribute should/can be provided
after the authentication (i.e. refresh, data packets, etc...)

A5. Section 2.2.  Mandatory support for server

How a TURN server that requires the usage of ORIGIN can signal this?

A6. Section 2. Other Usages

I think that other STUN Usages should be listed after section 2.3:

- Media Keep-Alive Usage (Section 20 of RFC5245)
- SIP Keep-Alive Usage (RFC 5626)
- NAT Behavior Discovery Usage (RFC 5780)

A7. Section 4, 3rd paragraph: "If the STUN MESSAGE-INTEGRITY attribute
is present, the contents of the ORIGIN attribute are integrity protected."

Which never happen in the usages listed in the document:  for section
2.1, there is never an integrity protection, and for 2.2, the ORIGIN is
needed to select the realm, so the ORIGIN is sent before it can be
protected.  Perhaps 2.2 should say that if ORIGIN was sent to select the
realm, it MUST be repeated at identical on the second Allocate (the one
that has an M-I) and that the server MUST reject it if it is not
identical to the first one.  Not sure it matters though.

Nits
----

- Section 2, 2nd paragraph: "The number used for the this in the ..."

Does not parse.

-- 
Marc Petit-Huguenin
Developer  |  Jive Communications, Inc.
Jive.com  |  marcph@getjive.com