[tram] STUN Origin Security Considerations
Brandon Williams <brandon.williams@akamai.com> Wed, 19 November 2014 01:25 UTC
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Date: Tue, 18 Nov 2014 20:25:01 -0500
From: Brandon Williams <brandon.williams@akamai.com>
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Subject: [tram] STUN Origin Security Considerations
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Hi all, In the meeting, I promised to follow up on this with a note to the list. Text in the current draft states the following: The STUN ORIGIN attribute also has privacy implications in that the origin information is shared with a STUN or TURN server which otherwise might not know this information. This information could be used to track usage of real-time communication services. A STUN or TURN server will always know the public IP address of each user, but the ORIGIN attribute provides more information about which service or provider is being used. The particular STUN and TURN servers used are selected by the real-time communications service provider (i.e. the web provider for WebRTC or the SIP or XMPP service provider). In addition, they are usually also run by the same provider, or by a trusted partner, especially for TURN. However, a service or provider using a public STUN server needs to recognize that the operator of the public STUN server will learn the identity of the service or provider through this extension. The last three sentences give the impression that the privacy concern does not apply to TURN servers, only to STUN servers, because TURN servers are more likely to be run by the application provider or a trusted partner of the application provider. This might not be true for auto-discovered, public, and other types of untrusted 3rd party TURN servers. The draft refers to "public STUN server" privacy implications, but I think the language could be broadened to cover all untrusted 3rd party relay servers. I propose the following minor modifications to the text, which I think clarify the intent. My changes are inclosed in [ ]. The particular STUN and TURN servers used are [usually] selected by the real-time communications provider ... However, a service or provider using an [untrusted third party] STUN [or TURN] server needs to recognize that the operator of the [third party] STUN [or TURN] server will learn the identity of the service or provider through this extension. Does this seem reasonable? --Brandon -- Brandon Williams; Senior Principal Software Engineer Emerging Products Engineering; Akamai Technologies Inc.
- [tram] STUN Origin Security Considerations Brandon Williams
- Re: [tram] STUN Origin Security Considerations Oleg Moskalenko
- Re: [tram] STUN Origin Security Considerations Alan Johnston
- Re: [tram] STUN Origin Security Considerations Simon Perreault
- Re: [tram] STUN Origin Security Considerations Tirumaleswar Reddy (tireddy)