Re: [Trans] Log checking should be asynchronous (Re: Volunteer opportunity! (was Re: DNSSEC also needs CT))

[Ben Laurie <[e-mail]>]

On 2 June 2014 17:57, Nico Williams <[e-mail]> wrote:
> On Tue, May 13, 2014 at 3:41 AM, Dmitry Belyavsky <[e-mail]> wrote:
>> Here are my ideas about "strict" behaviour of the TLS client:
>>
>> [...]
>
> IMO log checking should be mostly asynchronous.  This means that CT
> couldn't detect MITMing CAs in real-time, but that's OK because CT is
> about CA reputation, and all we care about is that when we detect
> lying CAs we can report them.
>
> This means that clients mostly should only reject TLS connections when
> there's no evidence of server certs being logged in an acceptable log.
>
> It also means we need some mechanism for reporting lying CAs.  Thus
> far reporting via blogs, news outlets, and trust anchor set managers,
> has been good enough, and I'm not sure that we need anything more than
> any async notification to users (and upstreams) by browsers (and other
> clients).
>
> There are privacy protection considerations in reporting lying CAs:
> report the name about which they lied, just the log entry(ies) that
> are missing, or just an assertion that they lied?
>
> Again, as I see it CT is purely a reputation-based system.  Reputation
> is established (and blemished/destroyed) asynchronously.

Just to be clear here - logs do not provide reputation. They provide a
mechanism by which others can establish reputation. I hope we agree on
this important point!

>
> This is important: we cannot be adding too much latency to TLS.  By
> doing log checking asynchronously we won't be.

Right.