Re: [Trans] Certificate verification

Linus Nordberg <linus@nordu.net> Sat, 18 October 2014 12:22 UTC

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From: Linus Nordberg <linus@nordu.net>
To: Matt Palmer <mpalmer@hezmatt.org>
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References: <871tq6uaf1.fsf@nordberg.se> <20141017234400.GT9502@hezmatt.org>
Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 14:22:22 +0200
In-Reply-To: <20141017234400.GT9502@hezmatt.org> (Matt Palmer's message of "Sat, 18 Oct 2014 10:44:00 +1100")
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Archived-At: http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/trans/YC1Msgqx7-Se_Bu_6NJlpWbGnsA
Cc: trans@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Trans] Certificate verification
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Matt Palmer <mpalmer@hezmatt.org> wrote
Sat, 18 Oct 2014 10:44:00 +1100:

| > Since the purpose of the log is to put light on bad certificates, would
| > it make sense to instead have text 1) specifying a minimum of checks to
| > be done (i.e. the chain) and 2) encouraging logging and publishing of
| > all other certificates?
| 
| IMO, yes.  My opinion is that a log which rejects certificates for reasons
| other than those required to maintain the operation of the log (ie spamming)
| is worthless -- you're *not* getting a complete view of what a CA intended
| to issue, you're getting some sort of filtered, sanitised view of it.

Thanks, this is my view as well. Happy to try to provide text unless
other people on the list have a good case against this.


| > On a minor note, I think that "trusted" in the very first sentence
| > should be changed to "known. Should I use the issue tracker?
| 
| I've been advised that for small, non-controversial changes, submitting a
| pull request direct to the github repo is fine.

Thanks, did that.