Re: [Uta] REQUIRETLS: another SMTP TLS mechanism
Jim Fenton <fenton@bluepopcorn.net> Fri, 25 March 2016 19:12 UTC
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References: <56F49E9B.2090403@bluepopcorn.net> <56F54A08.1070102@wizmail.org>
From: Jim Fenton <fenton@bluepopcorn.net>
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Date: Fri, 25 Mar 2016 12:12:48 -0700
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Subject: Re: [Uta] REQUIRETLS: another SMTP TLS mechanism
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On 03/25/2016 07:24 AM, Jeremy Harris wrote: > On 25/03/16 02:12, Jim Fenton wrote: >> draft-fenton-smtp-require-tls-01 >> The idea here is that REQUIRETLS allows the SMTP client to override the >> default "deliver even if you can't do it securely" behavior of SMTP. The >> philosophy is that the sender of the message (SMTP client) is in the >> best position to know if a given message should only be sent via TLS, >> either based on some information it has about the sensitivity of the >> message or based on the client's local policy. > - The draft does not mention alias-style forwarding done by an MTA; > perhaps it could? A 1-1 alias would seems to be easily covered, > but 1-to-many (mail-exploder) aliases may need more thought. REQUIRETLS is about satisfying the sender's expectations about how onward transmission of the message takes place. As a sender, my expectations wouldn't change if an MTA forwarded the message to more than one recipient, so I would want REQUIRETLS to be applied to all of the onward forwards. I agree, this could be more explicit. > > - I assume that mailing-list forwarding is not intended to be covered. > Perhaps that should be explicit. We had a little discussion about mailing lists and REQUIRETLS on the ietf-smtp list. Mailing lists (as distinct from mail forwarders/exploders, above) originate a new message from the mailing list. So I would expect REQUIRETLS from a mailing list to be at the option of the list operator, although it would be a good practice in many cases to follow the REQUIRETLS practices of the incoming message. Agree on making this more explicit, too. -Jim
- [Uta] REQUIRETLS: another SMTP TLS mechanism Jim Fenton
- Re: [Uta] REQUIRETLS: another SMTP TLS mechanism Aaron Zauner
- Re: [Uta] REQUIRETLS: another SMTP TLS mechanism Jeremy Harris
- Re: [Uta] REQUIRETLS: another SMTP TLS mechanism Jeremy Harris
- Re: [Uta] REQUIRETLS: another SMTP TLS mechanism John Levine
- Re: [Uta] REQUIRETLS: another SMTP TLS mechanism Orit Levin (CELA)
- Re: [Uta] REQUIRETLS: another SMTP TLS mechanism Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [Uta] REQUIRETLS: another SMTP TLS mechanism Jim Fenton
- Re: [Uta] REQUIRETLS: another SMTP TLS mechanism Jim Fenton
- Re: [Uta] REQUIRETLS: another SMTP TLS mechanism Jim Fenton
- Re: [Uta] REQUIRETLS: another SMTP TLS mechanism Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [Uta] REQUIRETLS: another SMTP TLS mechanism Chris Newman
- Re: [Uta] REQUIRETLS: another SMTP TLS mechanism Jim Fenton
- Re: [Uta] REQUIRETLS: another SMTP TLS mechanism Viktor Dukhovni