Re: [Uta] FYI: improved attack against RSA PKCS1.5

[Yaron Sheffer <[e-mail]>]

Hi Kohei,

Thanks for describing this attack. I guess the original Bleichenbacher 
attack and its derivatives do belong in the Attacks draft.

Sec. 7.4.7.1 of RFC 5246 (TLS 1.2) claims to be resistant to the 
Bleichenbacher attack, and as far as I understand your new attack 
improves the performance of that attack, but makes the same assumptions 
on the protocol as the older attack. Can you comment on the security of 
TLS 1.2 (or older versions) against your attack?

Thanks,
	Yaron

On 03/07/2014 01:57 PM, Kohei Kasamatsu wrote:
> Hi UTA folks,
>
>
> I'm kohei kasamatsu
>
> [1] is improved attack against RSA PKCS1.5 by Bleichenbacher.
> I think that it is better to consider it in draft-sheffer-tls-bcp.
>
> I recommend use of CCA secure public key encryption (variant of RSA)  as
> the countermeasure. (e.x. RSA-OAEP)
>
> [1] Romain Bardou, Riccardo Focardi, Yusuke Kawamoto, Lorenzo Simionato,
> Graham Steel, Joe-Kai Tsay: Efficient Padding Oracle Attacks on
> Cryptographic Hardware. CRYPTO 2012: 608-625
>
>   paper: http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/417
>   slide: https://www.iacr.org/conferences/crypto2012/slides/11-1-Steel.pdf
>
> Best,
>