Re: [Uta] E-Mail Protocol Security Measurements
Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> Tue, 10 November 2015 16:11 UTC
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Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2015 16:11:05 +0000
From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
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Subject: Re: [Uta] E-Mail Protocol Security Measurements
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On Tue, Nov 10, 2015 at 04:41:40PM +0100, Simon Josefsson wrote: > > You may reasonably > > claim that those criteria are almost never satisfied today and > > that almost all TLS connections between SMTP sender and SMTP > > receiver are made in the same casual way that almost all HTTPS > > ones are. > > That is far from true -- all significant web browsers out there validate > HTTPS certs against a pre-distributed CA bundle, and reject connections > when that fails. SMTP servers in general never reject connections when > cert checking fails. You may argue that CAs perform casual checking, > but it is distinctly better than permitting any certificates as in the > SMTP world. I agree that browsers meticulously check DV certificates that are well worth their $0.00 price. As for SMTP's "casual way" and HTTP's "distinctly better" alternative, these mischaracterizations gloss over fundamental differences between MTA-to-MTA SMTP and browser to web server HTTP. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7672#section-1.3 With HTTPS, TLS employs X.509 certificates [RFC5280] issued by one of the many CAs bundled with popular web browsers to allow users to authenticate their "secure" websites. Before we specify a new DANE TLS security model for SMTP, we will explain why a new security model is needed. In the process, we will explain why the familiar HTTPS security model is inadequate to protect inter-domain SMTP traffic. Please read Section 1.3 and subsections. Please understand that the existing (RFC 3207) use of TLS in SMTP is in the vast majority of cases unavoidably opportunistic and protects only against passive wiretap (reasonably well). Nobody denies that ideally we would address other risks, the above quoted RFC is one attempt at doing that. However, it makes no sense to merely "go through the motions" of checking WebPKI certificates with SMTP without addressing the fundamental barriers to getting meaningful security that way. Nor, consequently, does it make much sense to bemoan the lack of WebPKI certificate checks by all those casually irresponsible SMTP servers. Doing better in SMTP transport security means requires robust, downgrade-resistant out of band hardening of MX records and STARTTLS signalling. -- Viktor.
- [Uta] E-Mail Protocol Security Measurements Aaron Zauner
- Re: [Uta] E-Mail Protocol Security Measurements Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [Uta] E-Mail Protocol Security Measurements Aaron Zauner
- Re: [Uta] E-Mail Protocol Security Measurements Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [Uta] E-Mail Protocol Security Measurements Salz, Rich
- Re: [Uta] E-Mail Protocol Security Measurements Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [Uta] E-Mail Protocol Security Measurements Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [Uta] E-Mail Protocol Security Measurements Aaron Zauner
- Re: [Uta] E-Mail Protocol Security Measurements Aaron Zauner
- Re: [Uta] E-Mail Protocol Security Measurements Aaron Zauner
- Re: [Uta] E-Mail Protocol Security Measurements Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [Uta] E-Mail Protocol Security Measurements Aaron Zauner
- Re: [Uta] E-Mail Protocol Security Measurements Aaron Zauner
- Re: [Uta] E-Mail Protocol Security Measurements Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [Uta] E-Mail Protocol Security Measurements Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [Uta] E-Mail Protocol Security Measurements Aaron Zauner
- Re: [Uta] E-Mail Protocol Security Measurements Tony Finch
- [Uta] E-Mail Protocol Security Measurements Tom Ritter
- [Uta] it's not end-to-end *versus* hop-by-hop for… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [Uta] it's not end-to-end *versus* hop-by-hop… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [Uta] E-Mail Protocol Security Measurements Aaron Zauner
- Re: [Uta] [Ach] E-Mail Protocol Security Measurem… L. Aaron Kaplan
- Re: [Uta] E-Mail Protocol Security Measurements Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [Uta] E-Mail Protocol Security Measurements Aaron Zauner
- Re: [Uta] E-Mail Protocol Security Measurements Watson Ladd
- Re: [Uta] E-Mail Protocol Security Measurements Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [Uta] E-Mail Protocol Security Measurements Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [Uta] E-Mail Protocol Security Measurements Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [Uta] E-Mail Protocol Security Measurements Aaron Zauner
- Re: [Uta] E-Mail Protocol Security Measurements Viktor Dukhovni