Re: [Uta] Reviews requested - draft-ietf-uta-ciphersuites-in-sec-syslog

Chris Lonvick <lonvick.ietf@gmail.com> Wed, 20 September 2023 15:56 UTC

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From: Chris Lonvick <lonvick.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 20 Sep 2023 11:55:58 -0400
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Subject: Re: [Uta] Reviews requested - draft-ietf-uta-ciphersuites-in-sec-syslog
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Hi Viktor,

That works for me. I'll wait for the Chairs to ask for a new version before
publishing.

Best regards,
Chris

On Tue, Sep 19, 2023 at 12:39 PM Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
wrote:

> On Tue, Sep 19, 2023 at 07:25:51AM -0400, Chris Lonvick wrote:
>
> > I think that the changes to Sections 4 and 5 should be limited to
> > replacing "MUST NOT" with "SHOULD NOT". That will provide clear
> > guidance for implementers.
> >
> > I was then thinking of changing the Security Considerations section to
> the
> > following:
> > ---vvv---
> > 10.  Security Considerations
> >
> >    [BCP195] deprecates an insecure DTLS transport protocol from
> >    [RFC6012] and deprecates insecure cipher suits from [RFC5425] and
> >    [RFC6012].  This document specifies mandatory to implement cipher
> >    suites to those RFCs and the latest version of the DTLS protocol to
> >    [RFC6012].
>
> The above reads a bit clumsy, perhaps something along the lines of:
>
>     OLD: This document specifies mandatory to implement cipher
>          suites to those RFCs and the latest version of the DTLS
>          protocol to [RFC6012].
>
>     NEW: This document updates the mandatory to implement cipher
>          suites to conform with those RFCs and the latest version
>          of the DTLS protocol [RFC6012].
>
> >    The insecure cipher suites SHOULD NOT be offered.  If a device
> >    currently only has an insecure cipher suite, an administrator of the
> >    network should evaluate the conditions and determine if the insecure
> >    cipher suite should be allowed so that syslog messages may continue
> >    to be delivered until the device is updated to have a secure cipher
> >    suite.
> > ---^^^---
> >
> > Please comment and suggest any further edits for WG review.
>
> Module word-smithing, this is generally acceptable.  Prohibition of the
> weaker code points, rather than promotion of their replacements isn't
> [RFC7435] my most preferred approach to improving security, but it'll
> have to do when consensus that raising the ceiling will suffice is not
> within reach.  Thanks for taking my comments into consideration.
>
> --
>     Viktor.
>
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