Re: [Uta] 6125bis -- security considerations

"Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com> Fri, 01 October 2021 14:07 UTC

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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Ryan Sleevi <ryan-ietf@sleevi.com>, Alexey Melnikov <aamelnikov@fastmail.fm>
CC: "uta@ietf.org" <uta@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Uta] 6125bis -- security considerations
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Date: Fri, 01 Oct 2021 14:07:24 +0000
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Subject: Re: [Uta] 6125bis -- security considerations
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Thanks for your feedback, Ryan and Alexey.  I basically did what you suggested.

I share your concerns about the public suffix list.  Does the WG have any thoughts?  FYI, Ryan wrote this:


  *   I'm a little sad any time there is a new dependency on the public suffix list, even informative :) I realize the point is to say it's out of scope, and alternative language, such as "wildcard that spans multiple domain administration boundaries" is as clear as mud and reads like a mouthful of marbles. My main concern/consideration is that the whole "wildcards and PSL" is messy (all the more reason to keep it out of scope!), although I worry folks will read this and think "Oh, this is a hint to use the PSL, nudge and wink"

Alexey convinced me ALPN is out of scope, it’s more about “how to use TLS in applications” :) not this specific document.

I still would like comments on the last paragraph of the section:


  *   To accommodate the workaround that was needed before the development of the SNI extension, this specification allows multiple DNS-IDs, SRV-IDs, or URI-IDs in a certificate.

Should that go away now?  If so, that will have ripple effects.  Perhaps just add that this MAY be the equivalent of multiple names, could enable cross-protocol attacks, and should be avoided unless necessary?


The revised section is at https://github.com/richsalz/draft-ietf-uta-rfc6125bis/pull/29<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/github.com/richsalz/draft-ietf-uta-rfc6125bis/pull/29__;!!GjvTz_vk!HHlppXFTHBLKDYGimeX_L_WlwrRZzdDoVGRUTvmJdFazL5odZ53M_SBLIYdj$>