Re: [Uta] Proposed draft

[Loganaden Velvindron <[e-mail]>]

I've uploaded it here:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-lvelvindron-tls-for-email-02.

I'm looking forward to more feedback.
On Mon, Oct 15, 2018 at 5:12 PM Loganaden Velvindron
<[e-mail]> wrote:
>
> Thank you Sean. I will update the document and upload it.
>
> On Sat, Oct 6, 2018 at 5:53 AM Sean Turner <[e-mail]> wrote:
> >
> > Mostly just nits/style comments assuming that this moves as fast as ID.tls-oldversions-deprectate.
> >
> > 0) Add updates header “Updates: RFC8314”
> >
> > 1) Title
> >
> > TLS is now in the RFC editor’s abbreviations list so the title can now be:
> >     Use of TLS for Email Submission and Access
> >
> > 1) Introduction
> >
> > r/recommended for/recommended version for
> >
> > r/draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate/[ID.tls-oldversions-deprectate]
> > and add normative reference to:
> > [ID.tls-oldversions-deprectate] Moriarty, Farrell
> >
> > 2) If I were doing this I would do and OLD/NEW style as below. For the shorter changes, you don’t need it but for the s5 and s5.1 changes I was like what one earth are they changing.  E.g.:
> >
> > Table of Contents
> >
> > OLD:
> >
> >    4.1.  Deprecation of Services Using Cleartext and TLS Versions Less
> >    Than 1.1
> >
> > NEW:
> >
> >    4.1.  Deprecation of Services Using Cleartext and TLS
> >    Versions Less Than 1.2
> >
> > Section 4
> >
> > OLD:
> >
> >    As soon as practicable, MSPs currently supporting Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)
> >    2.x, SSL 3.0, or TLS 1.0 SHOULD transition their users to TLS 1.1 or
> >    later and discontinue support for those earlier versions of SSL and
> >    TLS.”
> >
> > NEW:
> >
> >    As soon as practicable, MSPs currently supporting Secure
> >    Sockets Layer (SSL) 2.x, SSL 3.0, or TLS 1.0 SHOULD transition their
> >    users to TLS 1.2 or later and discontinue support for those earlier
> >    versions of SSL and TLS.
> >
> > etc.
> >
> > 3) s5 changes
> >
> > I’d just change the sentences:
> >
> > OLD:
> >
> >    If, however, an MUA
> >    provides such an indication, it MUST NOT indicate confidentiality for
> >    any connection that does not at least use TLS 1.1 with certificate
> >    verification and also meet the minimum confidentiality requirements
> >    associated with that account.
> >
> > NEW:
> >
> >    If, however, an MUA
> >    provides such an indication, it MUST NOT indicate confidentiality for
> >    any connection that does not at least use TLS 1.2 with certificate
> >    verification and also meet the minimum confidentiality requirements
> >    associated with that account.
> >
> > 4) Terminology Section
> >
> > Since you do have 2119 language and you want to avoid the ID-nits you probably need a “Terminology Section” with the following text:
> >
> >    The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
> >    "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
> >    "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
> >    BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
> >    capitals, as shown here.
> >
> > 5) A little love for tls1.3
> >
> > So like we published 1.3 so it can’t hurt to add the reference:
> >
> > r/MUAs MUST implement TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] or later/MUAs MUST
> > implement TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] or later, e.g., TLS 1.3 [RFC8446]
> >
> > 6) References
> >
> > Since you’re downgrading 1.1 should we move it to an informative reference?
> >
> > Again to avoid ID-nits I guess add 1.1 as an informative and TLS 1.2 and 1.3 as normative?
> >
> > 7) Sec Cons
> >
> > I’d probably add something like see [ID.tls-oldversions-deprectate] for why 1.1 is being deprecated.
> >
> > spt
> >
> >
> > > On Oct 2, 2018, at 06:24, Loganaden Velvindron <[e-mail]> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Fri, Sep 21, 2018 at 3:12 PM Loganaden Velvindron
> > > <[e-mail]> wrote:
> > >>
> > >> Dear UTA folks,
> > >>
> > >> Please find the link here
> > >> (https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-lvelvindron-tls-for-email-00.txt)  for
> > >> the draft for Switching the minimum requirement for TLS in mail from
> > >> TLS 1.1 to TLS 1.2. This is inline with what is happening here:
> > >> https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate/blob/master/draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate.txt
> > >> where TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 are deprecated.
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> Feedback welcome.
> > >>
> > >
> > > ping.
> > >
> > >> Kind regards,
> > >> //Logan
> > >> C-x-C-c
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
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> >