Re: [Uta] is it time for 7525bis?

[Stephen Farrell <[e-mail]>]

On 17/04/18 16:22, Peter Saint-Andre wrote:
> During ART-ART and IESG review of draft-ietf-tram-stunbis, we realized
> that just pointing to RFC 7525 might not be enough anymore, now that the
> TLS 1.3 spec has been approved for publication. 7525bis, anyone?

I also think it's a bit early, but no harm to start the
work, as long as it's not rushed. I'd say it'll be a while
before e.g. we see some of the 0rtt car-crashes that it'd
be good to advise against;-)

S.

> 
> Peter
> 
> -------- Forwarded Message --------
> Subject: Re: Artart telechat review of draft-ietf-tram-stunbis-16
> Date: Tue, 17 Apr 2018 09:11:28 -0600
> From: Peter Saint-Andre <[e-mail]>
> To: Marc Petit-Huguenin <[e-mail]>, Eric Rescorla <[e-mail]>
> CC: [e-mail], [e-mail], IETF discussion
> list <[e-mail]>, [e-mail]
> 
> On 4/17/18 4:02 AM, Marc Petit-Huguenin wrote:
>>
>> On 04/16/2018 08:12 PM, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>>> On Mon, Apr 16, 2018 at 5:22 PM, Peter Saint-Andre <[e-mail]>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Hi Marc, a few further comments inline.
>>>>
>>>> On 4/16/18 5:43 PM, Marc Petit-Huguenin wrote:
>>>>> Hi Peter,
>>>>>
>>>>> Thanks for the review and sorry for the delay in responding, I was
>>>> traveling for the last 4 weeks.
>>>>>
>>>>> See my responses inline.
>>>>>
>>>>> On 04/02/2018 03:59 PM, Peter Saint-Andre wrote:
>>>>>> Reviewer: Peter Saint-Andre
>>>>>> Review result: Ready with Nits
>>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> <snip/>
>>>>
>>>>>> The first paragaraph of Section 6.2.3 restates recommendations from RFC
>>>>>> 7525; why not simply reference that specification?
>>>>>
>>>>> The original text in RFC5389 said this:
>>>>>
>>>>> " When STUN is run by itself over TLS-over-TCP, the
>>>>>   TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ciphersuite MUST be implemented at a
>>>>>   minimum. [...]"
>>>>>
>>>>> The new text is an attempt at updating it in the same spirit of giving
>>>> minimal instructions and complementing them with a reference to RFC 7525 -
>>>> which was the reason for the reference to RFC 7525 there.
>>>>>
>>>>> So I kept the text there, followed by the following paragraph, in
>>>> addition of moving the original last paragraph in the Security
>>>> Consideration section:
>>>>>
>>>>> " These recommendations are just a part of the the recommendations in
>>>>>   [RFC7525] that implementations and deployments of a STUN usage using
>>>>>   TLS or DTLS SHOULD follow."
>>>>
>>>> I would instead suggest that we do something like Section 2 of RFC 7590
>>>> for XMPP:
>>>>
>>>>    The best current practices documented in the "Recommendations for
>>>>    Secure Use of TLS and DTLS" [RFC7525] are included here by reference.
>>>>    Instead of repeating those recommendations here, this document mostly
>>>>    provides supplementary information regarding secure implementation
>>>>    and deployment of XMPP technologies.
>>>>
>>>> Here's the rationale: RFC 7525 is likely to be updated/replaced more
>>>> quickly than STUNbis. If STUNbis recommends a particular cipher suite
>>>> that 7525bis stops recommending, in the absence of STUNter will STUN
>>>> implementations keep following STUNbis or will they upgrade to whatever
>>>> 7525bis recommends? I suggest it will be the former, which is not what
>>>> we want.
>>>>
>>>
>>> I forgot about this in my review, but you should also profile ciphers for
>>> TLS 1.3.
>>>
>>> -Ekr
>>>
>>
>> Do you have any suggestion for these, or a pointer to a document that I can use to find these?
> 
> Off-topic: it sounds like we might need to start work on 7525bis...
> 
> Peter
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
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