Re: [v6ops] <draft-ietf-v6ops-464xlat-optimization-00.txt> - pre-(shepherd-writeup) review

[JORDI PALET MARTINEZ <[e-mail]>]

Hi Jen,

Still Reading thru all your points.

On this specific one, if the attacker spoof the DNS response, it will be able to create an invalid EAMT entry, so the client behind the NAT using that destination will not reach what it wanted to reach. This is not different if it happens without an EAMT.

Having the same result as a regular DNS spoofing, should I mention it in the security considerations? May be indicating that it is the same kind of attack as a DNS spoofing without the EAMT entry, so it is not a new security risk.

I will try to respond to the other later on in the morning, and if needed update the last version with the relevant clarifications.

Regards,
Jordi
@jordipalet
 
 

El 10/7/20 9:04, "Jen Linkova" <[e-mail]> escribió:

    Oh I forgot to add one more thing:
    - The Security Considerations section states that "This document does
    not have any new specific security considerations,
       besides the ones already known for DNS64.".
    I'm not sure it's the case. The proposed approach drastically
    amplifies DNS poisoning impact.
    If the attacker manages to spoof the DNS response the CPE would create
    an EAMT entry which would affect *all* traffic to that destination,
    even for devices/applications behind that CPE which might be using
    DNSSEC. This could create DoS attack vector and force CDN operators to
    turn off IPv6 for their caches.
    I believe that should be discussed in more detail.

    On Fri, Jul 10, 2020 at 1:58 PM Jen Linkova <[e-mail]> wrote:
    >
    > OK, I"ve read the document and before I finish the write up I'd like
    > to discuss a number of comments I have.
    > My apologies for not raising them during the WGLC - I was not paying
    > attention, got busy with work...
    >
    > 0) I might need coffee but I found the Abstract a bit confusing so if
    > I may suggest some text..
    >
    > ""IP/ICMP Translation Algorithm (SIIT) can be used to provide access
    > for IPv4-only devices or applications to IPv4-only or dual-stack
    > destinations over IPv6-only infrastructure. In that case the traffic
    > flows are translated twice: first from IPv4 to IPv6 (at the ingress
    > point to then IPv6-only network) and then from IPv6 back to IPv4 at
    > the egress point.  If the destination is IPv6-enabled that second
    > translation might not be required. This document describes some
    > optimization to 464XLAT and MAP-T deployments to avoid translating IP6
    > flows back to IPv4 if the destination is reachable over IPv6. The
    > proposed solution would significantly reduce the NAT64 utilisation in
    > the operator's network"
    >
    > 1) Introduction section
    > The draft says: "allow IPv4-only devices or applications to connect
    > with IPv4 services in Internet, by means of a
    >    stateless NAT46 SIIT (IP/ICMP Translation Algorithm) as described
    > by  [RFC7915]."
    >
    > Do you think it would help saying  "with IPv4 services in Internet
    > over IPv6-only infrastructure"?  Otherwise it sounds confusing - why
    > do we need anything at all to help IPv4-only clients to talk to
    > IPv6-only services?
    >
    > 2) ""This allows to translate the IPv6-only flow back to IPv4, in
    > order to forward it to Internet."
    >
    > I'm not sure we can call a flow 'IPv6-only'. Flows are usually IPv6 or
    > IPv4...I think the terms 'IPv6-only' and 'IPv4-only flows' are used
    > extensively in the draft.
    >
    > 3) "In both cases (NAT46 and NAT64), the translation of the packet
    >    headers is done using the IP/ICMP translation algorithm defined in
    >    [RFC7915] and algorithmically translating the IPv4 addresses to IPv6
    >    addresses following [RFC6052]."
    >
    > IMHO this text would be more readable if we split it in two sentences:
    > " In both cases (NAT46 and NAT64), the translation of the packet
    >    headers is done using the IP/ICMP translation algorithm defined in
    >    [RFC7915] . Translation between IPv4 and IPv6 addresses is done as
    > per RFC6052]."
    >
    > 4) Section 3 is called "Possible Optimisation". However it comes
    > before the Section 4 (problem statement) and the text seems to be more
    > about the problem.
    > Also, the first 3 paragraphs of Section 4 (until "until "As shown in
    > the Figure 4" text) seem to repeat Section 3. Shall those two sections
    > be merged?
    > Or am I missing anything and they are actually talking about different things?
    >
    > 5) "In the case of 464XLAT, a DNS64 ([RFC6147]) is (optionally) in charge
    > of the synthesis of AAAA records from the A records, so they can use
    >    a NAT64, without the need of doing a double-translation by means of
    >    the NAT46/CLAT." - who are "they"?  This is the first sentence of
    > the section so not sure who you are referring to.
    >
    > 6) Fig 1: Shouldn't it be 'Dual-Stack LAN', not 'LAN's Dual-Stack'?
    >
    > 7) ""As it can be observed in the preceding picture, the situation is the
    >    same, regardless of in case of a wired network with a CE Router or a
    >    cellular network where a UE is connecting other devices (which may be
    >    IPv4-only or have IPv4-only apps), by means of a tethering
    >    functionality."
    >
    > IMHO it's a bit hard to parse...Maybe smth like:
    > "Examples of a topology shown on the picture above includes:
    > - a residential ISP IPv6-only access network with a dual-stack LAN
    > behind a CPE performing NAT46 (CLAT);
    > - IPv6-only mobile ISP network when a UE performs CLAT for IPv4-only
    > applications running on that UE or for traffic originated by other
    > devices connected to the UE via tethering."
    >
    > 8) Section 5.1. Approach 1: DNS/Routing-based Solution
    > "5.1. Approach 1: DNS/Routing-based Solution
    > "Because the WKP is non-routable, this solution will only be possible
    >    if the CDN/cache is in the same ASN as the provider network, or
    >    somehow interconnected without routing thru" Internet."
    >
    > Maybe it's worth explicitly mentioning that this approach would
    > require that the path to the destination is NOT traversing NAT64
    > devices. Otherwise the simple configuration of such devices 'translate
    > everything with the destination address in the WKP' would become much
    > more complex.
    >
    > 9) Section 5.2.3
    > ""In normal conditions the TTL for both A and AAAA records, of a given
    > FQDN, should be the same,"
    >
    > I'm not sure it's the case actually and we can expect that to happen
    > 'normally'. Do you have any references proving that point?
    >
    > 10) Section 5.2.7. Behavior in case of multiple A/AAAA RRs
    > Sorry but I have difficulties understanding those two sentences. What
    > 'existing procedures'  the resolver must be using?
    > IMHO this section would be much easier to understand if there is an
    > example: the given FQDN has 15 A RRs and 5 AAAA RRs. What EAMT entries
    > would be created?
    > As most CDNs would have multiple entries, this is a key point of the proposal.
    >
    > 11) Section 5.2.8. Behavior in presence/absence of DNS64
    > "Furthermore,  because as indicated in Section 5.2.2, the EAMT entry
    > is not created
    >    when the service is IPv6-enabled."
    >
    > Is it correct? The section 5.2.2 seems to be talking about detecting
    > IPv6 enabled services and using their AAAAs for creating EAMT entries.
    >
    > 12)  (related to 11) The draft seems to assume that the CPE/UA knows
    > the NAT64 prefix somehow. As it's an operational document I believe it
    > would be beneficial to provide some guidance on how exactly the device
    > should discover the prefix. Obviously, the operator could use RFC8781
    > (PREF64 RA option) or PCE. Or the device and use RFC7050. However if
    > the device uses RFC7050 then the Section 5.2.8 shall discuss this.
    >
    > 13) IMHO sections 5.2.9.  Behavior when using literal addresses or non
    > IPv6-compliant APIs and 5.2.12. Behavior in case of Foreign DNS should
    > be follow each other or  sections 5.2.9. might have a reference to
    > 5.2.12.
    >
    > 14) Section 5.2.11 Behavior in presence of Happy Eyeballs
    > IMHO, this section should make it explicit and very very clear: as
    > soon as an EAMT entry is created for an IPv4 address, Happy Eyeballs
    > fallback to that IPv4 address becomes impossible. In case of
    > connectivity issues with the IPv6 address used in that EAMT entry, the
    > client would not be able to reach the destination.
    > I feel like the draft does not discuss the impact enough.  It's not
    > about delay, it's about IPv6 becoming the only protocol to reach
    > IPv6-enabled destinations for both dual-stack and IPv4-only hosts.
    > Maybe it's a good thing in 2020 ;)
    >
    > 15) Later in that section the draft says:
    > " So even if Happy Eyeballs is present, the fallback to IPv4-only
    > typically, will be slower than native IPv6 itself, because
    >    the added delay in the NAT46+NAT64 translations, when not using this
    >    optimization."
    >
    > I think it should be saying "IPv4 would be slower", not "fallback to
    > IPv4".  So maybe smth like " 'IPv4 is expected to be slower than
    > native IPv6 due to delays added by NAT46+NAT64. This optimization
    > reduced that delay by eliminating the need of the second translation
    > (NAT64)"?
    >
    > 16) The draft does not discuss the troubleshooting implication. For
    > example if I'm running 'traceroute 8.8.8.8 from my IPv4-only host and
    > there is an EAMT entry for 8.8.8.8.
    > IMHO this draft needs to discuss this and potential impact on tech
    > support procedures.
    >
    > 17) Another thing which seems to be missing is some guidelines on
    > controlling this feature. I'd suggest adding some text about that.
    > IMHO, the router vendors SHOULD (I'd vote for MUST even) have that
    > optimization disabled by default. The routers MUST have a knob to turn
    > it off if it's enabled.
    >
    > 18) Acknowledgements Section
    > Pls remove "....and TBD".
    >
    > --
    > SY, Jen Linkova aka Furry



    -- 
    SY, Jen Linkova aka Furry



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