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Re: [v6ops] Operational Implications of IPv6 Packets with Extension Headers - Security as Functionality

Fernando Gont <fgont@si6networks.com> Mon, 27 July 2020 09:25 UTC

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To: Vasilenko Eduard <vasilenko.eduard@huawei.com>, IPv6 Operations <v6ops@ietf.org>
Cc: "draft-gont-v6ops-ipv6-ehs-packet-drops@ietf.org" <draft-gont-v6ops-ipv6-ehs-packet-drops@ietf.org>
References: <ee0bbb4d1f844ee8aef70dff0986685f@huawei.com>
From: Fernando Gont <fgont@si6networks.com>
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Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2020 06:25:07 -0300
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Subject: Re: [v6ops] Operational Implications of IPv6 Packets with Extension Headers - Security as Functionality
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Hello, Edward,

On 27/7/20 05:57, Vasilenko Eduard wrote:
> Hi Fernando,
> Security is sometimes functionality, not vulnerability or attack vector. The good example is Firewall. Firewall needs to parse all headers to be useful.
> Hence, I believe it is in the logic of this draft to have section 5.1.5: one additional "use case" when parsing of ALL headers are mandatory. FW, IDPS

It's indeed normally necessary for a firewall to parse all headers, and 
certainly this might be a motivation to drop packets at the edge of the 
network.

However, I'm not sure if it would make sense to cover IDPS/FW in this 
I-D, since we're mostly discussing the reasons for operators (as opposed 
to say, sys admins or security administrators) to drop them.

What do folks think?

Thanks,
-- 
Fernando Gont
SI6 Networks
e-mail: fgont@si6networks.com
PGP Fingerprint: 6666 31C6 D484 63B2 8FB1 E3C4 AE25 0D55 1D4E 7492

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