Re: [v6ops] Revised I-D: Advice on RA-Guard Implementation

Joel jaeggli <joelja@bogus.com> Mon, 09 January 2012 17:03 UTC

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Date: Mon, 09 Jan 2012 09:03:11 -0800
From: Joel jaeggli <joelja@bogus.com>
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To: Gert Doering <gert@space.net>
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Subject: Re: [v6ops] Revised I-D: Advice on RA-Guard Implementation
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On 1/6/12 03:09 , Gert Doering wrote:
> Hi,
> 
> On Fri, Jan 06, 2012 at 10:29:10AM +0100, Gunter Van de Velde (gvandeve) wrote:
>> RA-Guard is a poor-man solution for access networks against rogue
>> RA's... the grown up solution is SeND.
> 
> We need both.  SeND won't help if network participants are not able
> to prime their machines with the certificates needed to authenticate RAs.
> 
> Think IETF networks...

Think any network where no pre-existing relationship exists.

> Gert Doering
>         -- NetMaster