comments on draft-ietf-v6ops-v6inixp-01.txt

[Nick Hilliard <[e-mail]>]

Hello,

a couple of comments on the v6inixp draft.

- the text needs some style editing and a quick run-over with a 
spell-checker. I'm happy to do this, but am just an ietf egg and don't know 
what procedure to follow.  The draft text as-is does not look like the 
canonical text source.

- it would probably be useful to mention that RA should be disabled on all 
peering lan client routers and if possible, should be blocked at a fabric 
level with some incantation of draft-ietf-v6ops-ra-guard.

- the ixp should maintain a list of

- section 6: there is no standard defined for TCP MD5 security for ipv6 
packets, although there are several interoperable implementations out there 
in practice.  RFC 2385 assumes ipv4.

- it may be good to suggest the use of GTSM in addition to MD5 / ipsec. 
Does anyone actually use ipsec for securing bgp sessions?  I hear only 
occasional talk and have never come across it in practice.

- is it worth suggesting that ipv4 bgp afi over ipv6 transport and ipv6 bgp 
afi over ipv4 transport should be explicitly frowned upon for route 
servers?  It adds complication for no gain whatever.

- security considerations - at face value none. Mind you, I could see small 
exchange customers getting very upset if their IXP wasn't using MLD 
snooping and one of their 1G or 10G customers decided to shift a couple of 
hundred megs of multicast traffic in a moment of experimental exuberance.

- section 2: (minor) ipv4 requires both 0x0800 (ipv4) and 0x0806 (arp)

- I'm still wrangling with myself about the value of an ipv6 ND sponge.  Is 
it better for an end-user DoS attacker to trash an ipv6 lan by causing 
persistent icmp6 multicast flooding, or by filling up the ipv6 neighbor 
cache on all connected routers with ipv6 address entries associated the mac 
address of an ipv6 ND sponge?  Has anyone actually measured this in 
practice?  Is the reaction vendor specific?  My worry is that attacks of 
this form will happen one day and right now we are not ready.

- is it worth recommending that the IXP use l3 ipv6 filters to permit only 
link-local traffic from their assigned (or chosen) address for the purposes 
of BGP and icmp6 only?  What I'm thinking of here is how to deal with 
people who will do broken stuff like configuring tunnels using their IXP 
assigned address.

Nick