[websec] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-evans-palmer-key-pinning-00.txt

Chris Palmer <palmer@google.com> Mon, 14 November 2011 21:44 UTC

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From: Chris Palmer <palmer@google.com>
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Subject: [websec] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-evans-palmer-key-pinning-00.txt
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FYI.


---------- Forwarded message ----------
From:  <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
Date: Mon, Nov 14, 2011 at 1:39 PM
Subject: New Version Notification for draft-evans-palmer-key-pinning-00.txt
To: palmer@google.com
Cc: cevans@google.com, palmer@google.com


A new version of I-D, draft-evans-palmer-key-pinning-00.txt has been
successfully submitted by Chris Palmer and posted to the IETF
repository.

Filename:        draft-evans-palmer-key-pinning
Revision:        00
Title:           Public Key Pinning Extension for HTTP
Creation date:   2011-11-14
WG ID:           Individual Submission
Number of pages: 7

Abstract:
  This memo describes an extension to the HTTP protocol allowing web
  host operators to instruct user agents (UAs) to remember (&quot;pin&quot;) the
  hosts&#39; cryptographic identities for a given period of time.  During
  that time, UAs will require that the host present a certificate chain
  including at least one Subject Public Key Info structure whose
  fingerprint matches one or more of the pinned fingerprints for that
  host.  By effectively reducing the scope of authorities who can
  authenticate the domain during the lifetime of the pin, pinning may
  reduce the incidence of man-in-the-middle attacks due to compromised
  Certification Authorities and other authentication errors and
  attacks.




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