Re: [websec] Issue 53 - Key pinning should clarify status of pin validation with private trust anchors
Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net> Tue, 05 March 2013 10:26 UTC
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Date: Tue, 05 Mar 2013 05:26:40 -0500
From: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
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Subject: Re: [websec] Issue 53 - Key pinning should clarify status of pin validation with private trust anchors
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On 03/04/2013 07:57 PM, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
> As discussed during Atlanta, the way that pinning is currently implemented
> within Google Chrome, pinning is only enforced as it relates to so-called
> "public trust anchors" (eg: those shipped by default as part of a browser
> or OS installation, not those installed by a user).
Sorry -- i wasn't in Atlanta, so i don't know the context or background
for this. Can you explain more?
Consider the case where pre-loaded trust anchor ("trusted root
certificate authority") X certified my web server's EE certificate with
pubkey Y, and i published a pin on Y and my backup pubkey Z (but no pin
on X).
Are you saying that if i switch my server to use Z, and it is certified
by some non-(pre)loaded trust anchor (or it is self-signed), then Google
Chrome will not respect the pinning and the connection will fail?
--dkg
- Re: [websec] Issue 53 - Key pinning should clarif… Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- [websec] Issue 53 - Key pinning should clarify st… Ryan Sleevi
- Re: [websec] Issue 53 - Key pinning should clarif… Yoav Nir
- Re: [websec] Issue 53 - Key pinning should clarif… Tom Ritter