Re: [websec] Richard Barnes' Discuss on draft-ietf-websec-x-frame-options-09: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> Mon, 19 August 2013 20:24 UTC
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Date: Mon, 19 Aug 2013 16:24:01 -0400
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From: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
To: "Hill, Brad" <bhill@paypal-inc.com>
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Cc: "draft-ietf-websec-x-frame-options@tools.ietf.org" <draft-ietf-websec-x-frame-options@tools.ietf.org>, "websec@ietf.org" <websec@ietf.org>, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, "websec-chairs@tools.ietf.org" <websec-chairs@tools.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [websec] Richard Barnes' Discuss on draft-ietf-websec-x-frame-options-09: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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Safari also renders the innermost frame. On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 3:31 PM, Hill, Brad <bhill@paypal-inc.com> wrote: > I received a question as to whether all browsers really implement the > top-level only check, or if any do an immediate parent or ancestor walk. I > could guess, but I'd rather test. Here's a test case for public use: > > http://webappsec-test.info/~bhill2/XFO/XFO_Top.html > > I checked the latest IE, Chrome, Opera and Firefox and they all render the > innermost frame. (don't have a Safari instance handy at the moment to test > but welcome others' reports) > > -Brad > ________________________________________ > From: Hill, Brad > Sent: Friday, August 16, 2013 4:44 PM > To: Richard Barnes; The IESG > Cc: draft-ietf-websec-x-frame-options@tools.ietf.org; websec@ietf.org; > websec-chairs@tools.ietf.org > Subject: RE: [websec] Richard Barnes' Discuss on > draft-ietf-websec-x-frame-options-09: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT) > > Additional comments inline. > ________________________________________ > > > (D3) Shouldn't ALLOW-FROM be followed by an origin, not a URI? In other > words, what does it mean to send "X-Frame-Options: ALLOW-FROM > https://example.com/this/is/a/path?query#fragment"? > > [Hill, Brad] Agreed. > > > (D3) In the ALLOW-FROM: what does "top level context" mean? Do you > really mean the top level here, as opposed to the next one up? For > example, suppose A loads B in an iframe, and B loads C, and then C sends > an X-Frame-Options header with ALLOW-FROM. Is the ALLOW-FROM origin > compared to B or A? In either case, you should also note the attacks > that remain. For example, if the answer is B, then B needs to use > X-Frame-Options as well, or else, A can maliciously frame A within B. Or > if the answer is A, then C is trusting A not to load any malicious > intermediate frames B. > > [Hill, Brad] This really does mean the top/final origin value in a frame > ancestor > chain walk. Browsers have implemented X-Frame-Options to check the > Origin context that is topmost in the window or tab. (the _top target, > representing the full, original browsing context, not just the immediate > parent frame) This could be clarified perhaps, but is not incorrect. > >
- [websec] Richard Barnes' Discuss on draft-ietf-we… Richard Barnes
- Re: [websec] Richard Barnes' Discuss on draft-iet… Hill, Brad
- Re: [websec] Richard Barnes' Discuss on draft-iet… Tobias Gondrom
- Re: [websec] Richard Barnes' Discuss on draft-iet… Barry Leiba
- Re: [websec] Richard Barnes' Discuss on draft-iet… Yoav Nir
- Re: [websec] Richard Barnes' Discuss on draft-iet… Richard Barnes
- Re: [websec] Richard Barnes' Discuss on draft-iet… Richard Barnes
- Re: [websec] Richard Barnes' Discuss on draft-iet… Richard Barnes
- Re: [websec] Richard Barnes' Discuss on draft-iet… Richard Barnes
- Re: [websec] Richard Barnes' Discuss on draft-iet… Tobias Gondrom
- Re: [websec] Richard Barnes' Discuss on draft-iet… Tobias Gondrom
- Re: [websec] Richard Barnes' Discuss on draft-iet… Richard Barnes
- Re: [websec] Richard Barnes' Discuss on draft-iet… Barry Leiba
- Re: [websec] Richard Barnes' Discuss on draft-iet… Hill, Brad
- Re: [websec] Richard Barnes' Discuss on draft-iet… Richard Barnes
- Re: [websec] Richard Barnes' Discuss on draft-iet… Tobias Gondrom
- Re: [websec] Richard Barnes' Discuss on draft-iet… Richard Barnes