[WIMSE] Re: IETF 127 Hackathon: WIMSE interop scenarios for agent call chains

Arun Thallapelly <arun@advitlabs.com> Fri, 13 November 2026 22:16 UTC

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From: Arun Thallapelly <arun@advitlabs.com>
Date: Sat, 14 Nov 2026 02:16:31 +0400
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To: Ben Le <ben.le@redthreadsec.com>
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Subject: [WIMSE] Re: IETF 127 Hackathon: WIMSE interop scenarios for agent call chains
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Hi Ben, Alexander,

One scenario from the human end of the chain, if there is room for it.

Appendix B of the passport draft leaves open a root receipt signed by the
principal's authenticator (WebAuthn). A plain WebAuthn signature shows that
the user approved, but not what the user was shown. OASNT Section 2.3
covers why the transaction-confirmation extensions were never implemented
by browsers, and why a mobile device, which renders the text and holds the
key in one trust boundary, is a place where binding the shown text means
something. Section 9.2 states the limits.

The scenario:
A person approves one exact request on a mobile device. The token carries
digests of the action, of the text shown to the person, and of the HTTP
request.
The action and the request match what executes, but the text shown to the
person described a different action.
Expected: a verifier that holds the action recomputes the display digest
and refuses (display-mismatch in our implementation), and no effect occurs.
Action binding alone would accept this token.
OASNT Appendix A.7.2 (R2) is a published token that does exactly this, so
any implementation can check its result without our code. The drafts are
draft-thallapelly-oasnt-02 and draft-thallapelly-oasnt-enforce-01.

Best,
Arun
https://omniarx.ai

On Fri, Nov 13, 2026 at 2:51 AM Ben Le <ben.le@redthreadsec.com> wrote:

> Hi Alexander,
>
> Thank you for running this. Your negative cases are close to what
> draft-le-agent-passport tries to pin down, so here are scenarios from that
> draft that extend yours across the two trust domains. Each has one expected
> result that two implementations can compare.
>
> 1. Status list unreachable. Make the status list for one hop unavailable,
> with no cached copy inside its time-to-live. Expected: the receiving
> service treats the credential as revoked and rejects the request. Variant:
> the operation is designated low value and a bounded grace period applies;
> expected: accepted only inside the grace period, rejected after it. Second
> variant: one unresolvable status anywhere in a delegation chain invalidates
> the whole chain.
>
> 2. Revocation after delegation. This extends your mid-transaction case,
> and I support Iman's version of it. Agent A in domain A delegates to agent
> B, the first request succeeds, and then A is revoked while B's credential
> has not expired. Expected: B's next call fails closed at the receiving hop,
> including when that hop is in domain B, and any high-value operation
> revalidates before it takes effect. Record the check that stopped it,
> whether any effect occurred, and the time from revocation to the first
> rejection, which the draft bounds by the smaller of the credential's
> remaining lifetime, the status list's time-to-live and the cache bound.
>
> 3. Delegation that widens. A downstream receipt grants more than the
> receipt it came from (a wider host, more methods, a longer lifetime).
> Expected: rejected at the hop that receives it. The draft's table of
> per-constraint comparison rules (host, port, methods, paths, tools, body
> size, call count, spend, expiry, audience) gives each implementation the
> same pass or fail for a given pair of receipts.
>
> 4. Cumulative limit across two services. Run it twice with a limit of N
> calls. First, each of two services counts on its own: expect the chain to
> exceed N in total, which shows why a shared limit cannot be enforced that
> way. Second, the receipt names exactly one service as the accounting party:
> expect the limit to hold at N. A receipt that carries a limit but names two
> audiences should be rejected.
>
> 5. Request rewritten in transit. A proxy changes the authority or path
> after the client signed. Expected: signature verification fails at the
> receiving service, unless the proxy forwards its own verification result
> over an authenticated channel that the service already trusts.
>
> 6. Tool description changes between hops. The credential pins the digest
> of each tool definition (and of the agent's build). Partway through the
> chain, a service serves a changed tool description, or the agent presents a
> different build. Expected: the next receiving hop checks the digests at
> call time and rejects the request.
>
> I can write each of these as a short scenario file with the inputs, the
> expected result and the log line to record, in whatever format your harness
> uses. If you tell me the format (or point me to the AI2II repository), I
> will send them before the hackathon starts. I would also like to join
> remotely; please send the details.
>
> The draft is at
> https://www.google.com/url?q=https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-le-agent-passport/&source=gmail&ust=1794609866981000&sa=E,
> and -01 will be posted after IETF 127. There is a side meeting on Tuesday
> 17 November (18:45 to 19:45 PT, Plaza A), where results from the hackathon
> would be very welcome.
>
> Best regards,
> Ben Le
> Redthread Security
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