Re: [xmpp] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-miller-xmpp-dnssec-prooftype-01.txt

Matt Miller <mamille2@cisco.com> Wed, 27 June 2012 16:19 UTC

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From: Matt Miller <mamille2@cisco.com>
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Date: Wed, 27 Jun 2012 10:19:39 -0600
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To: Philipp Hancke <fippo@goodadvice.pages.de>
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Subject: Re: [xmpp] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-miller-xmpp-dnssec-prooftype-01.txt
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On Jun 27, 2012, at 09:16, Philipp Hancke wrote:

> i'm pondering on the proof name. The prooftype is using dnssec, but uses it to extend the 6125 to allow secure delegation.
> I.e. it either explains how to do delegation within a PKI prooftype or is a proof PKI-Delegation proof.
> 
> DNSSEC alone might (mostly in the context of s2s and server dialback) be a different proof (used by the connecting server instead of dialbacks current faith in insecure dns).
> 

First; Peter and I will be submitting a new DNA (Domain Name Associations) draft soon, which defines a few terms like "prooftype", "delegation method", and "assertion mechanism".  The goal is to have it published before the end of the week, so stay tuned!

I don't think if DNSSEC in and of itself is really a proof; it's not providing verification material directly.  I do think it is a delegation method, which then makes dialback keys a worthwhile prooftype!


- m&m

Matt Miller - <mamille2@cisco.com>
Cisco Systems, Inc.