Re: [xmpp] #39: prohibition on TLS renegotiation

[Kurt Zeilenga <[e-mail]>]

On Jul 7, 2010, at 8:10 AM, Peter Saint-Andre wrote:

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> On 7/7/10 9:02 AM, Simon Josefsson wrote:
>> Kurt Zeilenga <[e-mail]> writes:
>> 
>>> I personally wouldn't have a problem with just saying "SHOULD NOT do
>>> TLS renegotiation".  That is, I don't see a particular need to detail
>>> how to implement a non-recommended capability.
>> 
>> I also dislike going into details about non-recommended approaches.  I
>> prefer MUST NOT over SHOULD NOT if we cannot think up at least one
>> use-case when the SHOULD NOT recommendation isn't followed.  Especially
>> since if a use case appears for TLS renegotiation, use of it (and what
>> it means for XMPP) can be described in a separate document.
> 
> Further: do we have a use case *now*? If not, why leave the door open?

One could argue that via the update specification approach, the door is always open.

I prefer the door to be a bit more open than that.  That is, a SHOULD NOT instead of MUST NOT.  But it's not all that big of a deal.

As far as use case, I simply note that personally prefer authentication mechanisms which do not require me to expose user information to a server which I have yet to authenticate.  I prefer this sufficiently to actually design and implement mechanisms which allow me to authenticate the server before authenticating exposing user information.  I suspect I'm not the only person with this preference.

-- Kurt